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THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
MarshallJ. Breger*
In the United States, administrativelaw suffers from a perceived lack of legitimacy largely due
to a lack of democratic accountabilityor what some have called a democraticdeficit. These
misgivings stem, in part,from a deep-seated American distrust of bureaucracy. This Article
examines how the questfor legitimacy has led practitioners (and theorists) of administrative
law to undertakefour interrelatedprojects: the Accountability Project, the Rationality Project,
the TransparencyProject, and the ParticipatoryProject all designed to create a substitute or
shadowform of democratic legitimacy.
Through an examinationof these projects, I clarify how they try to address the democratic
deficit, and whether they effectively do so. Specifically, this article investigates the impact of
judicialreview, informal rule-making,increasedaccess to information,andpublicparticipation
as efforts to meet the legitimacy challenge. Moreover it disputes the contention that the
pursuit of democratic legitimacy is less consequentialfor administrativelaw than the needfor
bureaucraticrationality,by illustrating that bureaucraticrationalityis but one component of a
larger scheme intended to serve as afunctional substitutefor legitimacy. At bottom, because
Americans do not share thefondnessfor the technocraticmodel displayedby many other legal
systems, legitimacy projects have an enduringplace in American administrativelaw.

I. Introduction

Administrative law is often seen as the stepchild of public law. In the United States, at
least, the excitement centers around constitutional law, where visions of grand theory
and public policy often clash.
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Too often we administrative lawyers have been lonely-never present at the
myriad constitutional law reform conferences held in Bellagio and Aspen to advise
newly-emerging democracies on how to draft constitutions and protect civil liberties.
Nonetheless, administrative law provides a unique perspective to understand the
relationship between the citizen and the state. It is a relationship based on everyday
life, be it the desire for a fishing license, a question of old age pensions, or safety in the
workplace. And as I will argue, this relationship raises basic problems of democratic
theory.
Administrative law in the United States suffers from a perceived democratic deficit.1
By this, I mean the concern that bureaucrats-the denizens of the administrative
state-lack the direct political legitimacy that comes from the discipline of popular
elections. True, there is indirect legitimacy: in the American political system, the
agents of bureaucracy are appointed in the main by elected officials. But the fit is
not exact. The very nature of the administrative state leaves issues freighted with
policy significance to the discretion of administrators, who hew to a "technocratic
model" rather than a "'populist" approach. 2 In this paper, I hope to explain some of
the efforts made in American administrative law to compensate for this perceived lack
of political legitimacy.
Before doing so, I need to state a caveat. Unlike other panelists in this symposium
my discussion is not comparative, but rather is focused largely on the American scene.

2

In that regard administrative law suffers from the same "counter majoritarian" problem so often
raised as a challenge for judges in Constitutional interpretation. The problem was most famously
set forth in ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962). See also Mihui
Pak, The Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty in Focus: JudicialReview ofInitiatives, 32 COLUM. L. J.
& Soc. PROBS. 237 (1999); Kenneth Ward, The Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty andLegal Realist
Perspectives of Law: The Place of Law in Contemporary ConstitutionalTheory, 18 J.L. & POL.
851 (2002). But see Julian N. Eule, JudicialReview of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503,
1531-32 (1990), who argues that Bickel erred in characterizing the problem with judicial review
as "counter-majoritarian" in nature. Instead, the more accurate description is that the problem
is "counter-republican" by nature, a portrayal which better describes how the Framers designed
American democracy: a representative system. Id.
CASS R. SUNsTEiN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 126-28 (2005). Sunstein
urges deference to the technocratic approach recommending insulation of specialists from unjustified
public fears, so that the government "respond[s] to [the] people's values, not to their blunders."
See also Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman, & John Gastil, Fear of Democracy: A
CulturalEvaluationof Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1071, 1075 (2006)(reviewing CASS R.
SUNsTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCPLE (2005)), explaining that "distort[ed]
risk perceptions have the largest impact on members of the lay public; [whereas] scientifically
trained experts are less vulnerable to these influences ......
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In my view, administrative law is one of the least likely areas of jurisprudence to be
open to international influences.3 The reason is that administrative law concerns are
deeply rooted in the unique structural arrangements of national legal systems and
deeply influenced by a legal system's domestic political context. This is particularly
true of American administrative law, whose principles are deeply embedded in the
idiosyncrasies of American separation of powers law-what many have called the
"structural constitution" 4-- as well as in the historical battle between the courts and
the executive in the English common law. Thus, one must be careful in suggesting that
one legal system draws on the jurisprudence of another. We must always remember
that administrative law in America is not easily transported into foreign legal systems
precisely because there are differences in the nature of the jurisprudence and the
nature of the state in each system.
Of course, common problems may suggest-at least to the academic--common
solutions.' The sociology of bureaucracy is not limited to particular jurisdictions. But
the notion of common problems needs to be carefully parsed. As Kenneth Anderson
notes:

4

Tax law is another area where it is unlikely international influences will have much effect due to
the "continuing vitality" of the revenue rule. GARY B. BoRN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 1034-36 (2007)(citing Her Majesty the Queen in Right
of the Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979)).
"The genius of the American Constitution lies in its use of structural devices to preserve individual
liberty. Checks and balances, separation of powers, and federalism all combine to create
opportunities for '[a]mbition . to counteract ambition'. ." Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin
H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 HARv. L. REv.
1153, 1155 (1992); see also J. Harvey Wilkinson, The StructuralConstitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV.

5

1687 (2004).
The Scandinavians, for example, spawned the concept of the ombudsman (however variously
applied world wide). See WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMAN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN
NINE COUNTRIES (1967); see also LINDA C. REIF, THE OMBUDSMAN, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 4-6 (2004); see DONALD C. ROWAT, THE OMBUDSMAN PLAN:
THE WORLDWIDE SPREAD OF AN IDEA 3-28 (1985).
Over thirty-five countries have used the American Freedom of Information Act as the model for
their own legislation. John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion
ofFreedom of Information, 85 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 111-12 (2006).
Lord Woolf, the Lord Chief Justice of England, referring to the Israeli legal system, has written of
the "close relations between the legal systems of our countries," pointing out that it is in public and
constitutional law issues that "the two countries have most in common." The Rt. Hon., The Lord
Woolf Lionel Cohen Lecture 2003: ConstitutionalDevelopments in a Common Law Jurisdiction,

37 ISR. L. REv. 5, 6 (2004).
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[C]ertain legal problems are "common" because they raise crossborder issues, such as settlement of water disputes or pollution
between countries. One might also talk of "common" legal problems
where the judiciary of one country might learn from the experience
of another country's courts and their special techniques. France, for
example, recently introduced a class action device, and it obviously
and intelligently looked to comparative models.6

Indeed there is significant academic discussion of the concept of policy transfer or
diffusion.' The matter is extremely complex. Consider as one example the American
approaches towards regulatory impact analysis (RIA) requiring cost-benefit analysis
before the promulgation of regulations. There is substantial evidence that the EU has
recently developed similar cost-benefit approaches. 8 Are these parallel developments?
Do they reflect policy transfer? Can there be diffusion without convergence?9 There
can be little doubt that European academics, if not Brussels bureaucrats, were aware
of American developments. Whether there was a causal connection is unclear.
But none of this has anything to do with causal relationships or indeed with the
underlying connection between administrative law and a nation's jurisprudential
ethos.

6 Kenneth Anderson, ForeignLaw and the U.S. Constitution, 131 POL'Y REV. 33, 40 (June & July,

8

2005) available at http://www.policyreview.org/jun05/anderson.html (last visited July 9, 2006).
See David Dolowitz, Stephen Greenwold & David Marsh, Policy Transfer: Something Old,
Something New Something Borrowed, But Why Red, White or Blue?, 52 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAMS
719 (1999); David Dolowitz & David Marsh, Who Learns What from Whom: a Review of the
Policy TransferLiterature, 44 POL. SrUD. 343 (1996); C. Bennett, What is Polic , Convergence
and What Causes it?, 21 Bir. J. POL. Sci. 215 (1991); see also David P. Dolowitz & David
Marsh, Learningfrom Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making, 13
GOVERNANCE 5 (2000).
For discussions of cost-benefit analysis in the EU, see Stephen M. Johnson, Economics '.Equity
H. the European Experience, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 417, 446-449 (2001); Robert W. Hahn and
Robert E. Litan, Counting Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons for the U.S. and Europe, 8 J.
Ir'L EcoN. L. 473,486-495 (2005). Recently, OJRA administrator John Graham, after "comparing
notes" with European Commission officials wrote, "I was amazed at how serious the EU has
become about regulatory reform." John D. Graham, The "Smart Regulation Agenda: Progress
and Challenges,31 ADmL4. & REG. L. NEWS 11, 14 (Winter 2006).
The answer as regards RIA in Europe is apparently yes, in that different EU countries appear to
have adopted their own variant of RIA. See Claudio M. Radelli, Diffusion Without Convergence:
How PoliticalContext Shapes the Adoption ofRegulatory, Impact Assessment, 5 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y
924 (2005).
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II. American Administrative Law

In my view, administrative law depends in huge measure on the jurisprudential culture
of individual jurisdictions-what Baron Montesquieu so quaintly called, "The Spirit
of the Laws."1 Thus, for example, much of continental Europe has instinctively
accepted "as inescapable"" and "unstoppable"' 2 Max Weber's paradigm classifying
bureaucracy as an expression of high rationality in government administration. 3
And for many in continental Europe such rationality in government was seen as far
preferable to the vicissitudes of a potentate or the variability of vox populi.
For example, this is the case in France, where-in contrast to the US- "members
of the Public... are much more likely to hold a hierarchical world view" leaving them
more confident in the expertise of administrators and technocrats 4 and more ready to
defer to their judgments on regulatory policy. 5 This deference to experts leads to the
view that bureaucracy is good and that a centralized state is the natural approach to
organizing society.'6

10M.

DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS

6-7 (Thomas Nugent, trans.

Robert Clarke & Co. 1873).
MAX WEBER, ECONOMY ANn SOCIETY

223 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff,

et al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968). See also Max Weber, Parliament and Government in
Germany Under u New Political Order: Towards a Political Critique of Officialdom and
the Party System, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 156-57 (Peter Lassman & Ronald Spears eds.,

1994)(describing bureaucrats as "always and increasingly a person with professional training
and a specialization").
' Id. at 156.

Id. at 159.
I9
14

Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic Donald Braman, & John Gastil, Fear of Democracy: A Cultural
Evaluation ofSunstein on Risk, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1071 (2006). Kahan et al., supra note 2.

'

See Paul Slovic, James Flynn, C.K. Mertz, Marc Poumadere, & Claire Mays, NuclearPower and
the Public:A Comparative Study of Risk Perception in France and the United States, in CROSSCULTURAL RISK PERCEPTION: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 87-89 (0. Renn & B. Rohrmann eds.,

2000). This cultural difference is said to explain the significant divergence between American and
French regulatory policy on nuclear power and why 78-80% of energy production in France is
nuclear despite findings that suggest the French perception of risks associated with nuclear power
is as high or higher than Americans. Id. at 57; see also Uranium Information Centre Ltd., Nuclear
Power in France:Briefing Paper28, August 2006, availableat http://www.uic.com.au/nip28.htm

(last visited March 3, 2007).
6 See John C. Reitz, PoliticalEconomy as a Major ArchitecturalPrinciple of Public Law, 75 TuL.

L. REV. 1121, 1128 (2001). See also EZRA N. SULEIMAN,

POLITICS, POWER AND BUREAUCRACY IN

17-19 (1974). Although the sweeping decentralization reforms
brought about by the Debr6 laws in 1982, at 730, codified in the General Code of Territorial
FRANcE-THE ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE

Marshall J. Breger

ISR. L. REv. Vol. 40 No. 1, 2007

Consider the story-likely apocryphal-of "the French Minister of Education
looking at his watch at three o'clock on a Monday afternoon and saying to a visitor:
'At this moment pupils in year five of every French school will be studying Racine."' 7
Accomplishing that degree of centralization takes a great deal of regulation.
For a short period of time from around the 1880s through the New Deal there was
a strand of American thought that was similarly approving of bureaucracy. It was
the age of science, of reverence towards experts and expertise. There was a belief
as Woodrow Wilson put it, in the "science of administration,"' 8 that politics could be
divorced from governing. Wilson, I should note, held these views while a college
professor. As candidate for President, he adopted a more skeptical view of what the
19
British call "boffins."'

Communities (Code Grnrral des Collectivitids Territoriales), and recently amended by Law No.
2004-809 of August 13, 2004, J.O., August 17, 2004, at 14,545. This recent modification expands
local authority in fields such as economic development, zoning, tourism, vocational training,
infrastructure, environmental protection, ports, solid waste, health, education, culture, sports,
heritage, performing arts training, and also offers a number of institutional clarifications.
17 Anne Corbett, Free and Compulsory: Republican Values in French Education, in EDUCATION IN
FRANCE: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE MITIERRAND YEARS 1981-1995 1 (Anne Corbett & Bob Moon
eds., 1996). For evidence of the centralization of French education, see also Kathryn M. AndersonLevitt, Regine Sirota & Martine Mazurier, Elementary Education in France, 92 ELEMENTARY
SCH. J. 343, 343, 345-348 (1968). However, since approximately 1982 significant steps towards
decentralization have been taken. See KETLEEN FLORESTAL & ROBB COOPER, DECENTRALIZATION OF
EDUCATION: LEGAL ISSUES 18-19 (1997); Hans N. Weiler, ComparativePerspective on Educational
Decentralization:An Exercise in Contradiction?, 12 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 433,
440-41 (1990); Sarah Elzas, Unrest in Education in France. Teachers on Strike, EDUC. UPDATE
ONLINE, July 2003, availableat http://www.educationupdate/archives/2003/julyO3/index.html (last
visited July 4, 2006); Barry James, InternationalEducation/A Special Report: France Pushes
Decentralization,INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 18, 2003, available at http://www.iht.com/
articles/2003/02/18/rfrance ed3_.php (last visited July 4, 2006).
11Woodrow Wilson, The Study ofAdministration, 2 POL. ScI. Q. 197, 209-210 (1887).
19In a Labor Day Speech, while campaigning in New York, Wilson exhorted:
What I fear, therefore, is a government of experts. God forbid that in a democratic country
we should resign the task and give the government over to experts. What are we for if we
are to be [scientifically] taken care of by a small number of gentlemen who are the only
men who understand the job? Because if we don't understand the job, then wveare not a
free people. We ought to resign our free institutions and go to school to somebody and find
out what it is we are about.
W. WILSON, A CROSSROADS OF FREEDOM: THE 1912 CAMPAIGN SPEECHES OF WOODROW WILSON 83 (J.

Davidson ed., 1956).
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This belief in administration as a science and expertise as the saving grace of
governance flourished well into the New Deal.20 According to this perspective, when
government perceives a problem it appoints a commission or agency to regulate or
manage the problem. The entire field, so to speak, should be left to the agency's
expert judgment of how, when, and in what way to fill in the regulatory canvass. This
perspective has been carried on by jurists like Justice Stevens with his penchant that
"broad discretion" be afforded agencies to "meet new and unanticipated problems."21
We should note, however, that Stevens wrote in dissent, and that the staying power of
such regulatory maximalism is clearly contested within the Court and the legislature.
This undercurrent of American history is dwarfed by a fundamental continuum
of American political thought-Americans distrust bureaucracy.2
This "deep
uneasiness," as James Freedman has put it, "about the coercive and dehumanizing
influence of bureaucratic organizations"23 has a number of sources. One reason is
the belief that bureaucracies "too often appear concerned primarily with formalistic
adherence to their own rules, rather than with seeking a personalized response to
the peculiarities of [the individual's] specific circumstances. 2 4 This concern that the
letter of the law often undercuts its "spirit" is well described in Philip Howard's best
2
seller, The Death of Common Sense. 1
Howard argues that while "we don't trust bureaucrats," giving them discretion
is "the only way for them to do anything, and the only way for us to know who to
blame."26 Thus, he wants to give bureaucrats flexibility to waive rules or not to waive
rules, to accept individuated compliance solutions; in short, to ignore the letter of the
law to accomplish its "spirit. '27 Ironically, Howard's remedy for pervasive over- and
under- inclusiveness in regulatory enforcement is to empower bureaucrats by giving
them even more responsibility (or in administrative law terms more discretion) to take
20 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEss

23-26 (1938), depicting the evolution of the need

for technologically competent regulatory agencies for the "translation of [New Deal economic]
legislation into reality."
21 MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218,235 (1994)(Stevens, J. dissenting); see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY

102-03 (2005).

Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Cm. L. REV. 1,
40-42 (1995).
23 James 0. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process,27 STAN. L. RaV. 1041,
1068 (1975).
24 Id. at 1066.
22

25 PHILIP K.
26

HowARD,
Id. at 180-81.

27

Id.

THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE:

How

LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA

(1994).
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matters into their own hands.2 As Howard explains, "if there is no flexibility for the
29
regulator, there is no flexibility for us.
Asecond strand of distrust ofbureaucracy is reflected by critics like former Congressmen
Newt Gingrich or Tom Delay who believe that "[r]egulatory agencies have run amuck and
need to be reformed,"30 and that laissez-faire or market-based solutions are presumptively
superior to regulatory regimes. While they want fewer regulations, they also want to
place substantial burdens on the regulatory process itself. Thus, they seek to restrict the
flexibility and discretion of administrative agencies through procedural constraints." As
Howard incisively points out, "[o]ne of the worst elements of the Republicans' plan for
regulatory reform is that they want to make it even harder to pass a new rule"32 Indeed
many would prefer "clogging the wheels of the federal bureaucracy," 33 taking ironic pride
in "add[ing] more red tape and judicial oversight,"" if not admitting that such action is a
' For,
"recipe for paralysis."35
as former Congressman David McIntosh suggests, "many
Americans think paralyzing the federal government would be a good thing."36
Some have argued that we are now at a kind of "constitutional moment," to borrow
from Bruce Ackerman,37 where American politics defaults to market-based solutions

21 Id. at

180.

Id. at 180-81.
30 Edmund L. Andrews, A Rising Deregulation Wave: Republicans Advance Pro-BusinessAgenda,
29

I-r'L HERALD TRm., Jan. 3, 1996, at 12; see also Rep. Tom DeLay, DeLay Seeks His "Holy Grail":
Regulatory Reform, ROLL CALL, Dec. 4, 1995, at 15.
3' See generally Loren A. Smith, Judicialization:The Twilight ofAdministrativeLaw, 1985 DuXE L.J.

427, 430, 437-38 (1985).
32 RegulatoryReform: The Casefor Common Sense, An Interview with Philip K. Howard,THE WASH.
MoNTHLY, Sept. 1995, at 23, 26 (quoting Mr. Howard during an interview concerning his book, THE
DEATH OF COMMON SENSE).

Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform-The Whole Story, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1995, atAl2 (arguing
that current congressional regulatory reform efforts may be largely symbolic and that effective reform
will require more substantive changes in the law).
34Id.
15

Id.; The Next Environmental Threat, N.Y. Tums, Feb. 12, 1995, s4, at 14.

36 See

Hearings on the Regulatory Transaction Act of 1995, H.R. 450 Before the Subcomm. On
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, Comm. On Government
Reform & Oversight, 104' Cong., 1" Sess. (Jan. 19, 1995)(opening statement of Congressman

David McIntosh stating that "unnecessary regulation has hurt the American people" and calling
for a six month moratorium on new federal regulations).
7 BRUCE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 49-50, 107-08 nn.4-5 (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMA\,
WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 311 (1998); BruceAckerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/Constitutional
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453,457-61, 510-15 (1989). For a critique, see Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional
Fact!ConstitutionalFiction:A CritiqueofBruce Ackerman s Theory of ConstitutionalMoments, 44
STAN. L. REv. 759, 766-75 (1992).
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and where the proponents of regulation have, as it were, the burden both of production
and of proof."
A third source ofAmerican skepticism of federal bureaucracy comes from our belief
in subsidiarity, or in our constitutional terminology, federalism. The French view that
every classroom in the country should have the same teaching schedule has historically
not set well with Americans. Some areas are constitutionally left to the states to regulate,
and thus federal bureaucracy is structurally limited as to its range of activity.
Some commentators (usually academics) have proposed new approaches to
government intervention based on informal approaches to regulatory management.
These initiatives, variously termed "democratic experimentalism,"39 cooperative
regulation," and "the Renew Deal,"41 are all premised in the view that "Americans
still want government to tackle... [large problems]; they just don't want government to
tackle these problems via the characteristic institutional form of the New Deal-Great
Society constitutional order, namely, bureaucracy. 4 2 Thus they use techniques such as
"contracting out,"43 "public-private partnership,"" and "reflexive" or "individuated"
38 Cass

Sunstein distinguishes two strands of regulatory reform in the 1990s, a technocratic and a

reactionary strand. Cass Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, ConstitutionalMoments and

the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 270-271 (1998). The technocratic approach proposes
"rationality" techniques to improve the regulatory process. The goal of the reactionary approach
"was to stall or eliminate regulation whatever its content-largely with procedural requirements
so extensive as to prevent agencies from doing much at all." Id. at 271.
9 Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, A ConstitutionofDemocratic Experimentalism,98 COLuM. L.

REV. 267 (1998)(proposes to permit industry adoption of best practices in exchange for freedom to
experiment with alternative regulatory possibilities.)
0 The term originated in the field of securities regulation. In the 1930s, Congress mandated "industry
self-regulation through the creation of registered national securities associations... [with the intent
of establishing]... a 'cooperative regulation'... [regime by which such] associations would regulate
[their numbers] under the supervision of the SEC." Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1179 (4th Cir.
1997)(quoting S. Rep. No. 75-1455, at 3-4; H.R. Rep. No. 75-2307, at 4-5). More recent examples
include OSHA's VPP program see U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Health & Safety
Administration, Voluntary Protection Programs, availableat http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/index.
html (last visited November 2, 2006); and EPA's Project XL. See U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Project XL, http://epa.gov/projectxl/file2.htm (last visited November 2, 2006).
41 Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall ofRegulationand the Rise of Governancein Contemporary

Legal Thought, 89 MiNN. L. REV. 342, 352-56 (2004).
Michael Doff, After Bureaucracy,71 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1245, 1271 (2004).
4 For a discussion regarding privatization by means of government contracting, see Jody Freeman,
The ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 155, 169 (2000), who urges that, through contracting,
many government agencies rely on "a private work force to assist them in implementing laws and
regulations," including the provision of services and execution of daily functions.
The use of public-private partnerships to tackle significant problems can be found in nearly every
42

area of administrative law. See, e.g., Nathaniel Lipkus, How to UnderstandProductDevelopment:
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regulation 45 all of which attenuate the federal bureaucracy's involvement in the
regulatory process.
While democratic deficits have been noted in other jurisdictions (including the EU
Commission),46 the deficit has been overcome by appeal to a technocratic paradigm,
i.e., the experts know best. Not so in the US, where American distrust of bureaucracy
creates what is the central goal of American administrative law: a "normative
yearning," in Peter Lindseth's words "for democratic legitimacy."47 Put simply,
administrative law and the actions of administrative agencies are not instinctively
legitimate-as the administrators do not obviously reflect the will of the people and
the administrators in the modem administrative state are given significant discretion.
This raises the question of whether the nature of administrative decision-making is not
consonant with a "rule of law" regime.48 As I suggested above, this is not a problem in
France and in numerous other legal jurisdictions. This kind of difference in political
and social philosophy challenges the view that administrative law worldwide has a
common evolving structure, a view reflected perhaps in the efforts of academics at

Public-Private Partnerships as Vehicles for Innovation in Combating Neglected Disease, 10
MICH. ST. J. MED. & LAW 385 (2006)(discussing the use of public-private partnerships in drug
and vaccine development); Haley Stein, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds:
The United States, Trade, and the Developing World, 3 Nw. J. TECH. & INrELL. PROP. 160, 174-78
(2005)(addressing the potential for public-private partnerships to "balance the need for strong
IP protections for business while maintaining developing world access to genetically modified
seeds."); Cheryl L. Wade, Lessons FromA Propheton VocationalIdentity- Profitor Philanthropy?,
50 ALA. L. REv. 115 (1998)(examining the use of public-private partnerships in the management
of public schools).
4 Eric W. Orts, Reflexive EnvironmentalLaw, 89 N.W. U. L. REv. 1227, 1232 (1995). For example,
reflexive regulation in the environmental law context means "[w]ith engendering a practice of
environmentally responsible management" where businesses impose upon themselves policies
which "minimize environmental harms and maximize benefits."). See also Richard B. Stewart, A
New Generationof EnvironmentalRegulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 21, 130-34 (2001).
Michel Rosenfeld, ComparingConstitutionalReview by the EuropeanCourtofJustice andthe U.S.
Supreme Court, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 618, 631-32 (2006); Theodora Kostakopoulou, Democracy
Talk in the European Union: The Need for a Reflexive Approach, 9 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 411, 41112 (2003)(arguing "that the question of democracy in the European Union cannot be addressed
adequately without first addressing the suitability of existing models of national democracy for the
formation of the European polity, and perhaps without radically transforming these models.").
" Peter Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Characterof Supranationalism:
The Example of the European Community, 99 COL. L. REv. 628, 694 (1999).
" Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1669,
1672 (1975)(noting that, "With the possible exceptions of military and foreign affairs functions
and times of national emergency, the Constitution recognizes no inherent administrative powers
over persons and property."). See id. at 1676 ("Vague, general, or ambiguous statutes create
discretion and threaten the legitimacy of agency action.").
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NYU law school to discern (I would say create) a "single global administrative space"
49
in international law.

III. Attempts to Meet the Challenge ofthe Questfor Legitimacy

This quest for legitimacy has led theorists ofAmerican administrative law to undertake
four interrelated projects. I will call them the Accountability Project, the Rationality
Project, the Transparency Project, and the Participatory Project. Each is an effort
to address the problem of democratic legitimacy by appealing to a kind of faux
legitimacy--one which reflects a rough substitute for the democratic process.
As the limits of one project becomes clear, another comes to the fore. At any one
moment in time, therefore, administrative law may contain all these efforts. As Gerald
Frug has noted (in regard to a comparable classification), "each model has not simply
replaced its predecessor. Instead, each has been added to the others, so that in the end
all of them have become part of legal discourse";5" yet none fully succeed, nor can
they. For the price one pays for rejecting the technological paradigm is that you must
rely on a "populist" or democratic paradigm to secure legitimacy in the administrative
state. But when you talk about democratic legitimacy and the administrative state,
you talk about a circle that cannot easily be squared.
4 This "single global administrative space" is said to be distinct from the traditional domains of
international law and domestic administrative law, and is increasingly governed by an emerging
"global administrative law" (GAL), which regulates decision-making and rule-making processes
in global regulatory administrative systems. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B.
Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAw & CONTEM. PROBS. 15 (2005)
availableat http://www.law.duke.eduljoumals/lcp/ (last visited July 9, 2006). A skeptical "take"
on the conceptual underpinnings of the politics and sociology of this project can be found in
Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, Global Civil Society: A Skeptical View in GLOBAL CIVIL SocIETY
2004/5 26 (2005).
o Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology ofBureaucracyin American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1277, 1284 (1984).
Lisa S. Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative

State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 469 (2003)[hereinafter Bressman, Beyond Accountability](citing
Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2253-54 (2001)), asserts that
the various models of the administrative state "did not so much succeed each other as 'bleed into
each other."' Kagan cites Frug for the premise that the models for mechanisms to approximate
democratic legitimacy intermingled chronologically. Id. Bressman goes further, imposing this
concept on the models themselves. I do not accept this last formulation, but rather suggest that the
models co-exist, independently, within the "legal discourse." See Bressman, BeyondAccountability
at 469.
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The Accountability Project reflects the effort of the Anglo-American common law
since the Middle Ages to constrain executive authority undertaken beyond the limits
of the law. Its principles were developed in the famous 171 century litigation, styled
Dr.Bonham s Case,51 which discussed judicial review of executive decisions.
The Rationality Project emerged after World War II and attempted to constrain
the administrative state by requiring that it act in a rational manner. The reality that,
in the modem world, more and more power was being delegated to administrative
agencies raises obvious problems in democratic accountability. One way to make up
for the accountability deficit was to demand that the courts protect the rationality of
agency decision-making. To put it otherwise, if we are not able to provide democratic
accountability through the electoral process, we can create virtual accountability by
demanding rationality (the presumption perhaps being that the popular will and the
rational thing to do will be in some measure congruent).
The Transparency Project is a post World War II approach that uses transparency
-- openness in government-as another method of ensuring legitimacy. Transparency
is seen as a substitute for accountability. The theory is that if the public is aware of
government actions, as well as the reasons for and background behind those actions,
the government will be likely to make certain its actions are more closely in accord
with the public will. Thus it is thought that transparency would provide a methodology
that provides virtual democratic legitimacy.
The Participatory Project was an effort to increase public participation in the
administrative rulemaking process. It was believed that such participation would
increase the legitimacy of the rulemaking process by serving a functional substitute
for the fact that bureaucrats are not properly elected.

A. The Accountability Project

The historic project of the English common law judges was to claim jurisdiction over
executive action and to regulate when the executive acted outside the powers given

5'

8 Co. Rep. 107a, 113 b, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 646 (C.P. 1610). For a detailed examination of the case,
analyzing Bonham in terms of English constitutional theory (rather than statutory construction),
see Raoul Berger, Dr Bonham s case: Statutory Construction or ConstitutionalTheory?, 117 U.

PA. L. RE%-. 521 (1969). Arecent appreciation of Bonham as it came to be understood in the United
States can be found in LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELN-ES-PoPULAR CONSTITUniONALISM
AND JuDicIAL REVIEw

19-24 (2004).
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to it by law. This was the essential purpose of the five prerogatory common law
writs: mandamus, probation, certiorari,quo warranto and the great writ of habeas
corpus. By thus keeping the executive within the bounds set by the legislature, the
accountability paradigm attempts to offer a substitute for democratic legitimacy. 2
In contrast, "the French thought of judicial review as violating the separation
of powers."53 Indeed, the French revolutionary decree of August 16 and 24, 1790
prohibited judicial review of administrative action, noting that "[j]udicial functions
are distinct and will always remain separate from administrative functions. Judges
may not, under pain of forfeiture of their offices, concern themselves in any manner
whatsoever with the operation of the administration, nor shall they summon
administrators to appear before them on account of their official functions. 5 4 To
appeal improper administrative action, French citizens had to appeal to specialized
tribunals that were themselves part of the executive branch.55
Sometimes the question ofwhether the executive acted beyond the powers afforded
him by statute is easy. The statute says do X; the executive should be ordered to do
X.
However, this is true only when X is a simple ministerial act, e.g., when the river
reaches 10 feet high on a flood marker, open the sluice gates to relieve the pressure
on the dam. Here, there is very little discretion involved in the ascertainment of
whether the river is 10ft high. The act is ministerial. If the executive fails to
follow that statutory directive he can be ordered to do so by a court under a writ of
mandamus.

52

The matter is best put in Dr Bonham 's case, decided in 1610, supra note 51 In that case, an Act
of Parliament during the reign of King Henry VIII had established a medical licensing board, a
"college perpetual of physicians and grave men." Id. at 107b. Bonham had persisted in a medical
practice unlicensed by the board. For this unlicensed practice, he was imprisoned for seven days
for contempt of the board. Consequently, Bonham brought an action for false imprisonment
against the board members. By that tort action, he sought to gain judicial review of the propriety
of the board's action against him.
The Court of Common Pleas took the case. In his opinion for the court, Lord Coke found that the
licensing board's determination that Bonham was "insufficient and inexpert in the art of medicine"

was reviewable. Id. at 1 Ob. Explaining that "they [the board] are not made judges nor a court
given them .. " See id. at 11 8a. Coke wrote that review by a court was essential if Dr. Bonham
was to have an "adequate remedy." See id. at 119a.
5 GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 151 (1997).
4 Id. at 135 (1997)(citing Decree of August 16-24, 1790, title II, art. 13, 363).
5 L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 47 (5th ed. 1998).
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The real world is rarely so simple. Much depends on whether you understand
executive action to be ministerial or a matter of discretion. And if it is a matter of
discretion, does this mean that the executive can do whatever it wants, e.g. open the
sluice at two feet, twelve feet, or wait until twenty feet?
We should note that American courts in the 19"h century took a very restricted
view of the kinds of actions that were reviewable.16 Before the Civil War, the
Supreme Court utilized what one might call a resjudicatamodel of judicial review,
"reallocat[ing] much final decisional authority to the executive branch" and focusing
.'on the jurisdiction" of the executive to act." Also, the kind of executive branch
action that was reviewable was limited to ministerial acts and not discretionary acts.
Furthermore, the concept of a discretionary act was extremely broad.
8
In that case, the widow of
Take the famous 1840 case of Decatur v. Paulding.1
h
the 19" Century naval hero, Stephen Decatur, sought a writ of mandamus to compel
the Secretary of the Navy to pay her two pensions--one under a general pension law
and the other under a special act of Congress passed for her alone. The Court held
that the Secretary's decision not to pay the second pension was "discretionary," not
"ministerial," because he had to decide (1) whether to reverse a predecessor's decision
on the subject, (2) how half-pay should be calculated, and (3) whether there was
enough money in the pension fund to satisfy all claims. The Court's attitude is well
expressed in its statement that the "interference of the Courts with the performance
of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government, would be
productive of nothing but mischief; and we are quite satisfied that such a power was
never intended to be given to them."59 Thus the principles of Decaturleft little range
for judicial review as it made almost all executive conduct "discretionary."

Even up until 1900, the Court held that "courts have no general supervising power
over the proceedings and action of the various administrative departments of the
government. '"60 However, institutional changes were afoot that would soon affect
56 Frederic P. Lee, The Origins ofJudicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36 GEo. L.J. 287,

295 (1948).
"' Ann Woodhandler, JudicialDeference to AdministrativeAction-A Revisionist History,43 ADMIN.
L. REv. 197,244 (1991).
'8 Decatur v. Paulding, 39 N.Y.U. L. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
Ild. at 516. See also Martin v. Molt, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 32-33 (1827)(stating that statutes
conferring discretionary power make the recipient the sole judge of the facts on which such
discretion should be exercised).
60Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 292 (1900)(holding that the removal of a clerk by the Secretary
of the Department of the Interior for inefficiency is not reviewable).

THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

legal doctrine. In the second half of the 191h Century, the national government faced
the challenge of regulating economic monopolies, or oligopolies-in particular the
railroads, which were "a central, if not the major, element in the political, economic,
and social development of the United States."'" The administrative commission form
of regulation had earlier been employed in Britain62 and at the state level in the United
States.63 The statutory creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 was
the natural derivation of these experiments. With the advent of national regulation,
the courts began to examine the powers of administrative entities, 64 although the
presumption of unreviewability was not reversed until the Supreme Court's 1902
decision in American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty. 65 In that case, the
Supreme Court found that the presumption was not applicable even though Congress
had not spoken to the question of judicial review. The Court stated that where an
official makes a mistake of law and acts outside the limits of his authority, "the
courts.., must have power in a proper proceeding to grant relief. Otherwise, the
individual is left to the absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action of a public and
administrative officer, whose action is unauthorized by any law and is in violation of
66
the rights of the individual.
Since Magnetic Healing, we live in a world that presumes judicial review
of administrative action. In large measure, that is because the discipline judicial
61 GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION

1877-1916 1 (lst ed. 1965).

62 In discussing regulation in Britain, I have relied on three principal sources suggested to me by Gary

Edles at the University of Hull. The first is a book by historian Henry Parris, GOVERNmENT AND
THE RAILWAYS INNINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1965). The book is a revised version of Dr. Parris's
Ph.D. thesis at the University of Leicester. At the time of writing, he was a Lecturer in Politics
at the University of Durham. The second is a book by economist C.D. Foster. C.D. FOSTER,
PRIVATIZATION, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP, AND THE REGULATION OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 44-52 (1992). Sir
Christopher Foster held a chair at the London School of Economics, was a British civil servant,
and is a senior partner of Coopers and Lybrand. At the time of writing during John Major's
Administration, he was special advisor to the U.K. Secretary of State for Transport on railway
privatization. The third source is an 1886 report by the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce
that preceded passage of the Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887. S.Rep. No 49-46, pt. 1, 54-63
(1886).
63 Id. at 65-66.
4 See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Tex. Pac. Ry. Co.,
167 U.S. 479 (1897)(concluding that the ICC's statutory power to determine the reasonableness of
rates did not include the power to prescribe rates, and discussing different forms of regulation, by
the various states, that pre-dated the creation of the ICC).
65 Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). A presumption of judicial
reviewability of agency action was expressly established in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136 (1967).
66 Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, supra note 65, at 110.
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accountability offers a way to overcome administrative law's democratic deficit.6 7
Thus, the central theoretical issue for administrative law in the 20th century has been
the drive to curtail agency discretion both through formalized adjudication procedures
and judicial review. This fear of empowering bureaucrats with flexibility reflects
a traditional concern that the administrative state, if unchecked, would likely act
68
arbitrarily and capriciously.
The so-called "bible" of administrative procedure-the 1946 Administrative
Procedure Act or APA6 9-- tells us that courts should preclude judicial review only
where specifically precluded by statute or when an action is committed to agency
discretion by law and therefore is an action not amenable to review.70 Courts also
read statutes that preclude judicial review exceedingly narrowly.7 Thus, when a
statute said that senior citizens cannot appeal a medical benefit determination, courts
have determined that the ban may apply to individual benefits but not to an attack on
the methodology used to determine awards.72 And similarly, when a statute did not
allow for judicial review of veterans' educational benefits, courts have found that
the preclusion does not apply to a constitutional claim regarding that benefit system
73
before a federal court.
The Supreme Court has even taught that it would be unconstitutional to preclude
judicial review of a constitutional claim. In a highly unusual case concerning the hiring
practices of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Court struggled with the question of
whether there were situations in which constitutional claims can be forbidden judicial
67 Lisa Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An ArbitrarinessApproach, 79 N.Y.U. L.

REV. 1657, 1658-59 (2004) [hereinafter Bressman, JudicialReview], argues that it is "erroneous"
to believe that "the constitutional structure is committed foremost to promoting political
accountability." I disagree. While there are certainly other important principles supported by our
constitutional structure, democratic legitimacy is historically and necessarily the primary area of
concern.
6 Marshall J.Breger, Government Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, 57 U. PITr.
L. REV.
423, 434 (1996). See also the classic American study on the structuring of discretion K.C. DAvis,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTCE: A PRELIMNARY INQUIRY 55-68, 111,226-27 (1969), urging different methods
of structuring discretionary power, particularly more extensive use of rule making and increased
openness in informal processes, in order to combat arbitrariness.

5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553-59, 701-06 (2000).
70 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a)(2000).

71Consider, as example, Zadvydas v. David, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), where the Supreme Court found

that statutory measures enacted to limit a deportable alien's right to habeas corpus could not apply
in the absence of a specific statute applying to a post-removal-period detention.
72Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 678 (1986).
71Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
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review.7 4 The majority found that even in the case of an intelligence agency the idea
of judicial review of the constitutional claims cannot be denied.75 I should point
out that Justice O'Connor strongly argued in her dissent that if it were possible to
preclude judicial review of administrative decisions when there is a constitutional
claim anywhere, this might be the case.76 And Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that
there is no right to judicial review of every constitutional claim of due process.77
Even when Congress decided that visa revocation decisions are insulated from
judicial review" federal courts, consistent with the "strong presumption for judicial
review," have managed to carve out a place for themselves. They have done so by
either narrowly interpreting statutory grants of discretion,79 or by determining that
provisions of the Immigration Act provided the Attorney General with objective legal
criteria to use in his decision and thus did not give him unfettered discretion." This
' Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592(1988), concerned a man discharged from the CIA after he voluntarily
revealed that he was a homosexual, since the agency viewed his sexual preference as a security
risk. Since the Director of the CIA had statutory authority to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure, Doe's discharge depended on the subjective judgment of
the director and there was no law to apply. In contrast, the recent case of Tenet v. Doe, 125 S. St.
1230 (2005), concerns two former spies for the United States, no United States citizens, who sued
the federal government to enforce its promise to "take care of them" once they came to the United
States. The Court found that the United States was insulated from suits based on covert espionage
agreements. See also Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
15 Webster v. Doe, supranote 74, at 603.
76 Id. at 605 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71 Id. at 613-14.
78 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546
(1996). It should be noted that Court has recognized Congress's ability to cut ofjudicial review entirely
in other areas as well. See Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974)(precluding judicial review of
certain Veteran's Administration determinations); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1997)(finding that
the Attorney General's failure to make a timely objection under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is not
subject to judicial review); Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340 (1984)(consumers of
dairy products could not obtain judicial review of milk market orders); Webster v. Doe, supra note 74,
(holding CIA director's decision to discharge an employee was not subject to judicial review).
78 Such that review of Immigration Judge's continuances were found not to be "mentioned specifically"
as committed to agency discretion. See Khan v. Att'y Gen., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 12524 (3d Cir.
2006), Sanusi v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2006), Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.
2005), Zafar v. Att'y Gen., 426 F.3d 1330 (1lth Cir. 2005), Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d
520 (9th Cir. 2004), Soltane v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 381 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 2004), and Spencer
Enters., 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003)(narrowly interpreting the bar to judicial review created by 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)(2000)). But see Yerovich v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 990 (10th Cir. 2004), and
Samirah v. O'Connell, 335 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2003)(interpreting broadly the bar to judicial review
created by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)(2000)).
80 See ANA Int'l Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2004)(interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1155 as "'not entirely
discretionary.") But see Jilin Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Chertoff, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 11589
(3d Cir. 2006)(interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1155 as entirely discretionary).
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means that there is, in the APA's language, "law to apply" and that "the right or power to
act is plainly not entirely within the Attorney General's judgment or conscience."'8 I
An interesting variant on this is the question of whether ongoing nonfeasance can
be reviewed. 2 In the 1980's, the Court in Heckler v. Chaney 3 found that an agency
decision refusing to regulate drugs used for lethal injections in executions was not
reviewable. The Court referenced the long common law tradition of prosecutional
discretion, the agency's need to make resource allocation decisions and the lack of any
legal standards (or "law") to apply. It held that the failure to regulate in a specific area
was not an agency action appropriate for judicial review.' Broadening Heckler, in
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 5 the Supreme Court determined that an
allegation that the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) failed to manage wilderness
lands according to requirements of the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976
is not subject to judicial review because the BLM was given by statute a great deal of
discretion in deciding how to implement its mandate.
The court found that the kind of agency action (or failure to act) properly reviewable
under the APA was "properly understood to be limited... to a discrete action."1s6 And
the Court made clear that "[t]he prospect of pervasive oversight by federal courts over
the manner and pace of agency compliance with such congressional directives is not
8 '7
contemplated by the APA.
Some commentators have suggested that the Norton court's "analysis cuts against
the logic of modern administrative law,"88 specifically the broad presumption ofjudicial
8j ANA, 393 F.3d at 894.
82 It is noteworthy that the Court has granted certiorari to consider the issue of nonfeasance in the
context of an EPA decision not to regulate carbon dioxide and three other "greenhouse gases."
Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960
(2006).
83 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1995).
A similar position was taken in United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002), where the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) refused to act on an individual's request to be relieved of a
statutory bar on firearms ownership by felons. ATF had returned Bean's petition without acting on
it because Congress had prohibited expenditure of any funds for processing such applications. A
unanimous Court held that judicial review was unavailable under either the specific statute or the
APA in the absence of an actual decision on the application.
8 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
6 Id. at 63.
87 Id. at 67.
8 William D. Araiza, Administrative Law Discussion Forum: In Praiseofa SkeletalAPA: Norton v.
Utah Southern Wilderness Alliance, JudicialRemedies for Agency Inaction, and the Questionable
Value ofAmending the APA, 56 ADwN. L. REv. 979, 983 (2004).
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review. Whether that presumption has reached its apogee remains to be seen. Indeed,
it may well be that increased executive control of the agency rulemaking process
and more vigorous congressional oversight (discussed below) may be replacing, in
part, the accountability function of judicial review. But to the extent to which we
have reached the limits of the accountability project through the courts, I believe it is
because the courts cannot themselves solve the legitimacy problem.
I should make clear that the presumption of review has no analytical connection
to the question of standing. While there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court,
starting in the 1960's, relaxed standing requirements with the result of increasing
access to courts, the Court has clearly begun to "right" itself, recognizing that there
are both constitutional limitations in standing as well as prudential concerns limiting
who can sue. The Constitution's Article III constraint constitutes a requirement that
there actually be a case or controversy, thus requiring that the plaintiff have a concrete
injury.89 The Constitution's Article II concerns make clear that decisions whether or
not to enforce statutes is an executive function not a private sector decision.90

B. The Rationality Project

Another important feature of American administrative law is its focus on rationality
as a justification for agency action. Indeed, as Jerry Mashaw suggests, reason is "an
92
91
exclusive ground for legitimacy" in administrative law. And the "force of reason"
matters in administrative law specifically because the administrative process lacks
the legitimacy of the legislative process. Over a quarter of a century ago, in National
89 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.

9 These views, of course, differ markedly from the Israeli position which has apparently expanded to
a kind of non-Hohfeldian citizens standing, largely eviscerating the concept as an analytical tool.
Thus, the Israeli High Court in Ressler v. the MinisterofDefense determined that any claim related
to government misconduct can be heard directly, through the bagatz procedure, in the Israeli High
Court. See HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. the Minister of Defense [1988] 42(2) P.D. 441. See also HCJ
217/80 Segal v. the Minister of Interior [1980] 34(4) P.D. 429, 443 (acknowledging the standing
of public petitioners in environmental cases); HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. Israeli Broadcasting Authority
[1981] 35 P.D. 365 (acknowledging that emotional injury may be a basis for standing).
This elastic, indeed some might say, promiscuous, approach to standing does more than promote
government accountability to a "rule of law" regime, it substitutes the courts for the executive in
implementing legal rules.
9'Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 70 FOROHAM L. Rv. 17, 20 (2001).
92

Id.
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Tire Dealers & RetreadersAssn., Judge Malcolm Wilkey of the DC Circuit struck
down portions of a Highway Safety Administration standard that were not backed up
by adequate rational justification. However, those portions of the standard mandated
by Congress were upheld, notwithstanding a lack of adequate justification. As Judge
'
Wilkey opined, "No administrative procedure test applies to an act of Congress."93

This emphasis on rationality is underscored by the judicial articulation of the notice
and comment requirement for APA informal rulemaking 94 and in the various White
House mandates for cost benefit studies prior to issuing "major" regulations.95 As
Peter Strauss has underscored:

[r]equirements of rulemaking "rationality" thus serve to impose
practical bounds on agency judgment that do not exist for
legislatures; Congress can with impunity amend a statute in selfcontradictory ways, but an agency trying to "have it both ways"
will likely fail the judicial test of rationality. From a perspective that
puts a high value on the place of reason in even political discourse
among citizens, this virtue might be thought to counterbalance the
missing discipline of the ballot box.96

The concept of informal rulemaking is a unique American contribution to
administrative law, one that promotes the rationality project.

Indeed, Professor

Kenneth Culp Davis called it "one of the greatest inventions of modem government."9' 7
One author has suggested that, "the paradigmatic process for agency formulation of
policy-informal rulemaking-is specifically geared to advance the requirements
of civic republican theory."9

Through its use, "the administrative state holds the
best promise for achieving the civic republican ideal of inclusive and deliberative

9 Id. (citing Nat'l Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar 491 F.2d 31, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
9 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
5 Exec. OrderNo. 12,866 Sec. 6(a)(3)(B)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). Amajor regulation
that likely will "have an annual effect on the economy of S100 million or more," adversely affects
diverse sectors of the economy, creates inconsistencies with other agencies, alters rights of
government entitlement holder, or raises "novel legal or policy issues." See id. Sec. 2 (f)(l)-(4).
96 Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: the Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31
WAKE FoREST L. REv. 745, 759-60 (1996).
1 DAviS ADrasTRATTvE LAw TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (Supp. 1970).
9 Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the BureaucraticState, 105 HIRv. L. RE.%.
1512, 1560 (1992).
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lawmaking."99
project.

And such "deliberative rulemaking" is central to the rationality

It must be acknowledged that the "notice and comment" experiment cannot be
revered as a total panacea. There is strong evidence that, in many cases, the notice
and comment process is used more by regulated interests than the public.' 0 This
should not surprise us as it is unlikely that institutional arrangements can, on their
own, negate economic realities. Nonetheless, the "notice and comment" requirements
do partake in the rationality project.
Section 553 of the APA requires that all new regulations be published as proposed
regulations, that time be afforded for citizen comment, and that the agency respond to
and reflect the comments in the final rule which should be accompanied by a concise
statement of basis and purpose incorporating those comments. So far, so good. The
remarkable feature of this so-called "notice-and-comment" rulemaking is that the
public has a chance to comment on the rules before they are finalized. This contributes
to rationality by obliging the agency to respond to citizen comments and to justify
its approach. By bringing the interests of commentators into the conversation, prepromulgation comments provide agencies an opportunity to gain data that can improve
the regulatory process, thus contributing to more "rational" regulation. But there is
more. Courts have required that agencies respond meaningfully to citizens' comments
when preparing the final regulation.1 1 They have further determined to take a "hard
look"'0 2 at the final rule, looking to see if the agency used incorrect statutory factors
or failed to use correct factors in drafting the rule. Most importantly, the agency must
give a "reasonable explanation" for making the decision it did. Furthermore, the
record on which the agency acted must be available to the public so that we can all
test the reasonableness of agency action. Thus the agency must show that it did not act
03
"irrationally," or to use the technical locution, in an "arbitrary and capricious manner."'
By requiring agencies to give reasons, and courts to provide in depth review of those
reasons, the notice and comment rulemaking process serves to promote rationality.0"

99 Id.

See CORNELIUS M. KERWrN,

RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY

182 (3d ed. 2003); see infra note 176.

101United
2
103

States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977).

See infra p. 41 and note 185.

5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A)(2000).
should note that some commentators have suggested that "notice-and-comment rulemaking is to
public participation as Japanese Kabuki theatre is to human passions-a highly stylized process
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Rational analysis, of course, requires knowledge. Thus the Clinton administration,
through Executive Order 12,866,0 required all rulemaking agencies to "prepare an
agenda of all regulations under development or review."'" This list requires agencies
to coordinate the President's regulatory agenda. But it also forces agencies to list (and
prioritize) their proposed regulatory actions. Such a planning requirement assists in
developing rational analysis for the administrative state.
Another example of the rationality project is the increased use of cost-benefit
analysis in rulemaking. The premise of this position is simple: it is unreasonable
-indeed it is irrational-to promulgate a rule in which the costs are greater than
the benefits. The argument is variously stated that Congress could not have meant
to authorize an agency to act so irrationally, or at least that we can presume that
Congress did not so intend, unless it makes a "clear statement" that that is its goal.
Of course, the problem is that Congress has on many occasions acted to require
regulations without seeming reference to costs. At one point, the Senate passed
proposed legislation which required cost-benefit analysis as a precondition of agency
rulemaking "except where the enabling statute pursuant to which the agency is acting
directs otherwise."' 7 Grants of statutory power to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA),as example, to protect worker safety are not limited by the
cost-benefit calculus."0 ' Neither are many of our anti-pollution laws."0 9
In recent years an effort was made by some jurists (most notably in the D.C.
Circuit) to develop the notion that the default position in administrative law is one
where benefits must exceed costs; that is to say, some form of cost-benefit analysis
is the governing rule of reasonableness unless the statute chooses another rule." 0

for displaying in a formal way the essence of something which in real life takes place in other
venues.'" Frank B. Cross, Shatteringthe FragileCasefor JudicialReview ofRulemaking, 85 VA.

L. REV. 1243, 1312 (1999).
'o5 Exec. Order No. 12,866, supranote 95.
10

Id.

107Regulatory

Reform Act, S.1080, 97" Cong. (1981). [Dr. Ginsberg (DC)].
Or so the Supreme Court interpreted the OSHA statute in American Textile Manufacturers Inst. v.
Donovan, 452 US 490, 519-20 (1981).
"See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001)(holding that the Clean Air
Act bars the Environmental Protection Agency from considering costs of implementation when
setting national ambient air quality standards).
" 0 "[C]ourts have often taken the word "reasonable" in a statute to require that burdens be justified
by the resulting benefits." International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement
Workers v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1991)(citing Consolidated Rail Corp. v. ICC,
646 F.2d 642, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1981) for the proposition that safety measures must be reasonable,
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This position was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Whitman v. American
Trucking,"' but its spirit hovers in the background of academic discussion, creating a
climate that suggests that cost-benefit analysis is proof of reasonableness.
Courts aside, the Executive branch (that is to say the President) since Ronald
Reagan, has supported the idea that agencies should undertake cost-benefit studies
before promulgating rules." 2 In a series of Executive orders, recent presidentsRepublican and Democratic-have required agencies to undertake cost-benefit
studies before promulgating "major" rules that have significant economic impact." 3
President Bush left Clinton's executive order largely intact, including the provisions
on cost-benefit analysis." 4 However, President Bush did strengthen the role of the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a sub-agency of the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB)," 5 by more aggressive use of OIRA's oversight

meaning "that they produce an expected safety benefit commensurate to their cost; and second,
that when compared with other possible safety measures, they represent an economical means of
achieving the expected safety benefit.")). In 1994, the D.C. Circuit had the opportunity to revisit
International Union I and found that OSHA had conformed with nondelegation doctrine through
a supplemental statement of reasons which, in part, "forc[ed] the agency at a minimum to adopt
the cheapest standard that will achieve the desired level of safety." International Union, United
Auto., Aero. & Agric. Implement Workers ofAmerica, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665,668 (D.C. Cir.
1994) See also Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 530 n. 55 (19 81)(citing United
Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1265 (198 l)(requiring that cost of standards
regulating toxic materials not "threaten[] the competitive stability of an industry.")); American
Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd,448 U.S. 607 (1980)(OSHA
was found to be obligated to determine if the expected benefits of a new benzene exposure limit
had a reasonable relationship to the costs imposed by the standard); see also CASS R. SUNsmIN, THE
COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTuRE OF REoULATORY PROTECTION 46-48 (2002).
..Whitman v. Am Trucking Assr, supra note 109.
112Some might argue "'since Jimmy Carter," as he required agencies promulgating regulations to
engage in "rudimentary cost-effectiveness test[s]" and prepare descriptions of the problems they
were addressing, alternative approaches, and "analysis of the potential economic impact of the
regulation." However, "more substantial progress towards regulatory process reform came later
[under the Reagan administration] when cost-benefit analyses were mandatory and incorporated
into the regulation design process." See Murray Weidenbaum, Regulatory Process Reform, 20
REo. 20-26 (1997).
" 3 Exec. Order No. 12,291, Sec. 3 (d), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 198 1)(Reagan), revoked by
Exec. Order No. 12,866, Sec. 6 (a)(3)(B)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (Clinton).
' 14 Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb. 28, 2002). In this order, President Bush
eliminates the role of the Vice-President from the regulatory review process.
"

Robin Kundis Craig, The Bush Administration Use andAbuse ofRulemaking, PartP. The Rise of

QIRA, 28(4) ADMIN & REG. L. NEWS 8 (2003), availableat http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/news/
adlawsummer03.pdf (last visited March 3, 2007).
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function.116 One manifestation of this is the unprecedented use of "prompt letters,"
proactive directives from OIRA "suggesting that an agency explore a promising
regulatory issue for agency action, accelerate its efforts on an ongoing regulatory
matter, or consider rescinding or modifying an existing rule.""' 7 As of May 12, 2005,
twelve prompt letters had been issued." 8
For its part, Congress has long debated the use of "cost-benefit analysis" in
regulatory reform." 9 While it has not instituted it generally, it has required its use in
a number of circumstances including the "Unfunded Mandates Reform Act."' 20 This
is a statute that affects agencies that promulgate regulations creating federal spending
requirements for the states. Such agencies must provide a "qualitative and quantitative
assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits" of such federal mandates when they
result in an aggregated expenditure of 100 million dollars (indexed for inflation).'12
22
The effort to ensure that the chosen regulatory approach "maximizes net benefits"'
has led to the development of risk analysis, including a developing variant, riskrisk analysis. Risk-risk analysis suggests that in determining costs, one has to look
not only at the risks of not acting, but also the risks of promulgating a government
regulation.2 3

" 6"Presidential oversight of the regulatory process, though relatively new, has become a permanent part
of the institutional design of American government." Richard Pildes & Cass Sunstein, Reinventing
the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1995). Some commentators have suggested that the
goal of OIRA is less ensuring rational administrative activity and more providing ammunition
to support an administration's political (often anti-regulatory) policy references. See THOMAS
McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY 271-91 (1991). See also Joseph Cooper & William F. West,
PresidentialPower & Republican Government, 50 J. POL. 864 (1998).
1 Memorandum from John D. Graham, OIRAAdministrator, to the President's Management Council
(Sept. 20 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/oira-review-process.html
(last visited March 3, 2007). All agencies must normally respond to prompt letters within thirty
days. Id.
"'Office of Management and Budget, OIRA Prompt Letters available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/inforeg/promptletter.html (last visited March 3, 2007). The last prompt letter issued
was November 16, 2004.
"1 See generally Cass Sunstein, Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48
STAN. L. REv., 247, 275-82 (1996).
1202 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571 (2000).
M Another example is the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182,
110 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-15 (2005) and in scattered other
sections of the U.S. Code (requiring use of cost-benefit analysis in establishing drinking water
standards)).
12'
Exec. Order No. 12,866 Sec. 6(a)(3)(B)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
23
1 See JOHN D. GRAHAM & JOHN WIENER, RISK v. RISK 227 (1995) for a discussion of "constructive
ways, through the use of risk tradeoff analysis [("RTA")], to make better policies that provide more
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It must be recognized that there are serious issues with implementing the costbenefit principle. The most salient are laid out in a book by Cass Sunstein generally
supportive of cost-benefit methodology.1 24 For example: 1) How do you assess costs
or benefits to goods like health or beauty? That is to say, how do you monetize
qualitative goods? 2) How do you compare different goods, like leisure time and
wages? This is the so-called incommensurability problem. 3) How do you take into
account the wide magnitude of the range of possible numbers?125 4) How do you
126
monetize or discount costs and benefits to future generations?
These difficulties aside, the cost-benefit principle is an effort to make the regulatory
process more subject to rational analysis. It is part of the rationality project-an effort
1 27
to make "reason" a shadow substitute for democratic legitimacy.

C. The TransparencyProject

Until recently, the prevailing theory in England was that you needed a reason to
receive information about what the government does. 128 The presumption in America
protection of human health and the environment" and an "outline how RTA should be incorporated
into decisionmaking about medical treatment and government regulation (including legislative,
administrative, and judicial functions.)" See also Cass R. Sunstein, PrecautionsAgainst What?
Availability Heuristic and the Cross Cultural Perception, 57 ALA. L. REv. 75, 85-86 (2005).
Sunstein asserts, "A great deal of evidence suggests the possibility that an expensive regulation
24

1

can [actually] have adverse effects on life and health.'" Id.
See CASS SuNsTEiN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 71-87

(2002).
125 As example, an Environmental Protection Agency cost-benefit analysis of arsenic in drinking
water resulted in figures of benefits that ranged between 13 million dollars and 3.4 billion dollars?
This is the so-called interdeterminancy problem.
26

See MATTHEw D. ADLER & Eic A. POSNER, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL EcoNoMIc, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 270 (2001)(calling traditional cost-benefit analysis a "failure," but
arguing that properly conceived the principle "is sufficiently accurate in tracking overall wellbeing and has sufficient other procedural virtues-it is relatively cheap to implement, relatively
easy to monitor by oversight bodies, and relatively undemanding of agency expertise").
127We should note the cautionary note of Colin Diver that "[t]he leading metaphor for comprehensive
1

rationality is not the spirited debate of the town meeting but the scientist's lonely search for truth."
Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 393, 425
(1981).
128Change came with passage of the Freedom of Information Act, 2000, ch. 36 (Eng.). The United

Kingdom's legislation is more limited in scope than the United States' Freedom of Information Act
for two reasons. The first is that "a public authority [may] refuse a request for example because
further information is required to enable it to comply (... ); the cost of compliance would exceed 'the
appropriate limit' (...); the request is 'vexatious' or is a repeated request for the same information
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is exactly the opposite. Any person can request information and, generally speaking,
does not have to show any specific need for the requested information. Indeed, the
government needs a reason for not letting citizens have information. Such reasons are
129
linked to specific statutory exemptions, which must be construed strictly.
Starting in the 1960's, Congress passed a variety of laws designed to promote
transparency in government. These include the Freedom of Information Act, 3 ' the
Federal Advisory Committee Act,"' and the Government in the Sunshine Act.' Such
laws serve "to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic
society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable
to the governed."' 33 Transparency, then, would promote accountability and provide
another support for legitimacy. For as James Madison noted in 1821, "[a] popular
Government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.""M
There can be no doubt that the task of maintaining openness by both government
and regulated entities has become far easier in the computer age.'35 Using what
has been described as "E-Government,"' 36 vast strides have been made in placing

'9

.... " The second is that a public authority is always in the position of deciding "'whether the public
interest in disclosure is outweighed by the public interest in concealment." 0. HooD PHILLIPS AT
AL., CoNsTrrrlONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 615 (8th ed. 2001). The authors question "'whether
the Act with its extensive exemptions will ensure that there is more open government [because]
there is plenty of opportunity provided by the Act to foster continued secrecy in government." Id.
at 616. The European Union's Council of Ministers has also made efforts to improve transparency
in its proceedings by establishing a rule for the publication of the provisional agendas of meetings
in which it would be acting in a legislative capacity. 2000 O.J. (L 009) 22-23.
"Consistent with the Act's goal of broad disclosure, these exemptions have been consistently given
a narrow compass." U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 151 (1989).

1305

U.S.C. § 552 (2000).

1315

U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2000).

.325

U.S.C. § 552(b)(2000).

133Justice Marshall wrote this quote specifically regarding FOJA.

See NLRB v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,242-43 (1978)(denying a FOIA request based on NLRB's "longstanding
rule against prehearing disclosure of witness statements.").
" Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE COMPLETE MADISON 337 (Saul
Padovered. 1953)
135 Henry H. Perritt, Jr. PresidentClinton ' InformationInfrastructureInitiative: Community Regained?,
69 Cm-KEN-L. REv. 991, 1011-13 (1994).
6 E-government includes: e-publication, which is "by far the most important and widespread
government use" involving "dissemination or 'publication' of information;" e-filing or "online
filing of official documents, such as tax returns, corporate and non-profit filings, security interest
filings...;" and e-procurement, or "government use of the Internet for buying and selling goods and
services." See John C. Reitz, Section VI: Computers and Law: E-Government, 54 AM. J. CoMo. L.
733, 734-35 (2006).
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information about the regulatory process on the web.' 37 An offshoot of e-government
is what John Reitz terms "e-democracy." Reitz notes that the "ease of communication
provided by computers and the Internet has the potential to revitalize the practices
of democracy by bringing government officials into much easier and often more
' 38
productive communication with the public."'
Given that computer files are clearly "documents" under the Freedom of
Information Act, 39 the prospect of widening the ambit of government disclosure
inexpensively becomes a real possibility. Furthermore, the Electronic Freedom of
Information Act Amendments of 199614 created "electronic reading rooms"'' that
offer extensive information to the public. The idea is that there is no point in requiring
agencies allow interested parties to comment on proposed regulations without giving
them the necessary data to make informed comments. This raises transparency to a
new level.
Further, as electronic filing becomes more prevalent, affirmative dissemination
of documents becomes easier. Now, "any person can obtain the records, leaving no
paper trail to indicate that records on a subject had been downloaded by anyone."142
Thus, ease of access improves. Indeed, it is now possible to use hypertext to link files
and documents that would affirmatively provide citizens with records of proposed
government action allowing for a kind of affirmative transparency. In fact, courts
have used this transparency concept to require full and robust "records" in rulemaking
cases)

43

"'Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations, availableat http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.
html (last visited March 3, 2007).
131
Id. at 735.
39

' See Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979).
40

Pub. L. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).

141U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE

(2004), availableat http://www.usdoj.

gov/oip/readingroom.htm (last visited March 3, 2007).
142
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(citing Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971))(requiring disclosure of the full record
before the agency at the time a rule is promulgated, stating that where "an agency justifies its
actions by reference only to information in the public file while failing to disclose the substance
of other relevant information ... a reviewing court cannot presume that the agency has acted

properly, but must... perforce find [the agency's] actions arbitrary.").
"' The

development of electronic docketing of agency documents also raises knotty problems of

privacy, copyright protection, censorship, security concerns as well. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The
Future of Electronic Rulemaking: A Research Agenda, 27 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEws 6 (Summer

2002).
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Transparency can even serve as an alternative to regulation. Under appropriate
circumstances, an agency may avoid direct regulation of regulated entities by
requiring them to provide information to the general public. Often the informed
public is able to exert sufficient influence on the regulated community to alleviate the
need for further administrative activity. We can see this clearly in statutes like the
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act.'" For example, that Act
requires companies to share information about hazardous materials. Often providing
information to the public is all that is needed to influence the behavior of the regulated
community.
The underlying theory is that if citizens have the facts they will be better able
to make rational choices. If consumers know, for instance, that certain foods are
genetically modified, they may not choose to purchase them, thus affecting business
behavior. Similarly, notices placed on cigarettes warning of the risks of cancer will
presumably reduce the incidence of smoking by affecting consumer behavior. Such
government required transparency, it is hoped, will inform public opinion in ways that
will mimic the rational voter, thus creating a democratic shadow orfaux legitimacy
for the administrative enterprise.
While the impetus for transparency has stalled somewhat after the tragedy of
9/11, 145 the resulting war on terror, and the concomitant concerns for the protection
of critical-infrastructure, the thrust remains: a recognition that transparency in
bureaucracy resolves, in part, the administrative state's legitimacy problem."6

142 U.S.C. §§ 11001-05; 11021-23; 11041-50 (2000).
See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public s Right to Know and the War on Terror,
B.C. L. ScH. FAC. PAPERS, 25:35 (2005). See Gina Marie Stevens, HOMAIN'D SECURITY ACT OF

2002:

CRTcAL INFRAsTRucTuRE INFORMATiON

ACT (Congressional Research Service 2003); Marc

Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11, 86 Mr\,. L. RE%,. 1115 (2002); Kristen
Elizabeth Uhl, The Freedom ofInformation Act Post- 9/11: Balancingthe Publics Right to Know
CriticalInfrastructure Protection, and Homeland Security, 53 AM. U.L. REv. 261 (2003); Tom
Beirle & Ruth Greenspan Bell, Don 't Let "Right to Know" Be a War Casualty, 94 CHRIS-m. , SCI.
'
MONITOR 9 (Dec. 2001); Stephen Gidiere, Checks, Balances, and FOJA " 40 Anniversary, USA
TODAY, July 5, 2006, at 11A.

' While I have no knowledge as to any causal relationship, I should note that Israel too has since
1998 accepted in broad terms at least, the transparency principle in its own freedom of information
law. Freedom of Information Law 5758-1998, L.S.I. 226, available in English at the Israeli Police
website, http://police.gov.il/english/InformationServices/Law/xx-info-law. (last visited February
11,2007).
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D. The ParticipatoryProject

The Participatory Project was an effort to increase public participation in the
administrative rulemaking process.' 47 It was believed that such participation would
increase the legitimacy of the rulemaking process by serving as a functional substitute
48
for elected legislatures-thus solving the "democratic deficit" of administrative law.'
And as one proponent of interest-group participation has concluded, "[a]gency
decisions made after adequate consideration of all affected interests.. .have...
legitimacy based on the same principle as legislation."' 49 This approach "drew force
from a general social trend that came to view agencies less as apolitical 'experts'
administering a strictly rational process, and more as political bodies making choices
among alternatives in response to social needs and political inputs."' 50
The revolution in participation was not a single, coherent movement. It included
many disparate initiatives with widely variable effects. However, the driving force of
the revolution was a lack of faith in the ability of established governmental institutions
to understand the popular will and respond appropriately; again, a crisis of legitimacy.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the American people experienced a transformative struggle
for civil rights, unsatisfactorily explained assassinations of revered public figures,
an unpopular war, political scandals, and a growing disaffection with government,
which appeared unable to accomplish ambitious social objectives. 5' The motives
of those seeking to expand public participation ranged from a near-paranoid mistrust
of the government's own motives, to a populist belief that direct input from citizens
would improve the quality of the government's decisions. Also prominent was a faith
in participation as a means of empowering and involving the disenfranchised and
unrepresented which "to its defenders" reflected "a quest to expand the meaning and

Some elements in the preceding projects also have "participatory" features, and some approaches
partake of multiple projects. This exemplifies the point made supra, at note 50, that the various
projects exist at the same time. See also infra text accompanying notes 155-57.
"'48Bressman, BeyondAccountability,supra note 50, at 475 (citing Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation
117

ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARv.L. REV. 1667, 1712 (1975)).
B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667,

149Richard

1712 (1975).
Strauss, supra note 96, at 755.
See TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE SIXTIES (2nd ed. 2004); Leon F. Litwack, The Times They Are AChanging, in THE WHOLE WORLD'S WATCHING: PEACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE MOVEMENTS OF THE 1960s
AND 1970s 5-8 (2001).

50

'5'
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practice of freedom." 15 2 Participation in the rulemaking process is guaranteed by the
APA's notice-and-comment provisions for informal rulemaking.5 3 Specifically, an
agency must publish a notice of proposed rulemaking with a draft rule and leave the
The final rule must take these comments into
record open for public comment.'
account and agencies must explain in a "concise statement of basis and purpose"
accompanying the final rule exactly how they responded to public comments. 55
As one court has suggested, these requirements are "intended to insure that the
process of legislative rule-making in administrative agencies is infused with openness,
'
explanation, and participatory democracy."156
In its heyday, the participation project led to a lowering of barriers of access to
the courts'57 and to intervention in agency proceedings. 58 For a time, courts required
various forms ofjudicially imposed public hearings crafted to meet a supersized notice
and comment requirement in informal rulemaking. In the 1970s, the Supreme Court
slapped down those efforts, precluding judicially created duties beyond those called
for in the APA or enabling statute."' They made clear that courts could not promote
participation beyond that provided by statute.

2

Sheldon Wolin, The DestructiveSixties and Postmodern Conservatism, in REASSESSING

THE

SIXTIES

129, 132 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1997).
1535 U.S.C. § 553 (b)-(c)(2000).
54
"' The APA does not tell us how long the public gets to comment. For adiscussion of enabling statutes

that contain time periods see JEFFREY

S. LUBBERS,

A

GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENcV RULEMAKING,

278-

80, 296-98 (4th ed. 2006). E.O. 12,866, states that the period should "in most cases" be not less
than 60 days, however that recommendation is not judicially enforceable. Exec. Order No. 12,866
Sec. 6(a)(1-2)(3) C.F.R. 644 (1993) reprintedas amended in Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg.
9384 (Feb. 28, 2002).
. United States v. Garner, 767 F.2d 104, 120 (5th Cir. 1985)(citing 5 U.S.C. § 553 (c)).
"' South Carolina ex rel. Patrick v. Block, 558 F. Supp. 1004, 1015 (D.S.C. 1983)(emphasis added).
57
' See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)(opening standing
rules); Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669
(1973). In Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966), the D.C. Circuit held that a more inclusive standing requirement could only apply when
plaintiffs sought to vindicate the broad public interest, not just private interests.
58
' As the American Bar Association Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice states
in its Black Letter Statement of FederalAdministrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 31 (2002),
"Agencies engaged in informal rulemaking may provide additional procedures beyond those
established by the APA, other applicable statutes, and the agencies' own rules, but courts may not
require them to do so."
" Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524, 54449 (1978).
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Moreover a number of recent participatory "project" efforts have excited

democracy theorists, although the jury is still out as to their actual effect in
promoting civic participation in the administrative process. One such technique
is "negotiated rulemaking," by which the agency invites key "stakeholders" to
sit at the table and participate in the drafting of the rule.1 60 Even when agencies
do not make use of this approach, they may incorporate principles of negotiated
rulemaking into their actions.' 6'

Another technique is the federal government

'6oJefferey S. Lubbers, Approaches to Regulatory Reform in the United States: A Response to the
Remarks of Professors Levin andFreeman, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1893, 1904 n.33 (2005)(Negotiated
rulemaking remains a source of significant debate. Critics have argued that employing regneg "allows agencies to transfer too much control to private parties," see William Funk, When
Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove
Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Comment, Consensus Versus
Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206 (1994); and William
Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of
the PublicInterest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351 (1997), while Cary Coglianese, has empirically challenged
"the basic assumption that regulatory negotiation has produced faster and less litigated rules."
Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The PromiseandPerformanceof NegotiatedRulemaking,
46 DuKE L.J. 1255 (1997); Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking:
A Response to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386 (2001). Conversely, authors of other

studies have strenuously defended reg-neg, Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U.

ENVTL.

L.J. 32 (2000)(inciting a response by

Professor Coglianese); Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus
Conventional Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN.
REs. & THEORY 599 (2000)(finding that participants felt negotiated rules were superior, and more
likely to be implemented, than conventional rules); Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory
Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 60 (2000)(finding significant
legitimacy benefit); Philip J. Harter, A Plumber Responds to the Philosophers:A Comment on
Professor Menkel-Meadow "s Essay on Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 379 (2004-05). See

also Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle, & Andrew Dorchak, ChoosingHow to Regulate, 29 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REv. 179, 195-202 (2005)(finding good arguments on both sides, but generally siding
with Coglianese on empirical debate with Harter); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders:
Limits On CollaborationAs The Basis For Flexible Regulation 41 WM. &

MARY

L. REV. 411,

458 (2000)("The collaborative process is most promising, however, if used as a tool to guide
agency discretion, rather than as an alternative mechanism to promulgate regulations backed
by the coercive power of the state."); and Siobhan Mee, Comment, Negotiated Rulemaking and
CombinedSewer Overflows (CSOs): Consensus Saves Ossfication?,25 B. C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV.
213 (1997)(lauding the success of this particular reg-neg).
.6For example when the Federal Highway Administration revised its Manual on Uptown Traffic
Control Devices in May 2001, it "delegated authority to a group whose membership was drawn
from the American Association of State Highway Officials, the National Association of Country
Engineers, the American Public Works Association and other organizations with expertise in the
operation of traffic control devices." Steven J. Balla, Between Commenting and Negotiation: The
Contours of Public Participationin Agency Rulemaking, 1 /S 59, 80 (2004/2005). Much of this
group's work was incorporated into the notices of proposed rulemaking published in the Federal
Register.
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E-Rulemaking Initiative, 6 2 spurred by the E-Government Act of 2002163 and the
development of the Federal Docket Management System, 164 a centralized federal
system designed to spur citizen access to the rulemaking process. The centerpiece
of this effort, Regulation.gov, is designed to assist citizens to locate and submit
electronic documents on proposed agency regulation. 165
Democracy theorists have begun to speculate how participatory models can be used
in administrative law. Some have drawn from the deliberative democracy proposals
of democratic theorists, like Jim Fishkin, 166 to support a two-tier rulemaking system.
Besides traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking, the system would offer enhanced
participation "involv[ing] a series of administrative jury deliberations (juries featuring

162See Regulations.gov: Your Voice in Federal Decision-making, http://www.regulations.gov/
fdmspublic/component/main (last visited March 3, 2007).
E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899. The E-Government Act "fill(s) a gap
in the APA, which does not by express terms require the agency to make the comments its (sic)
receives during the comment process available to the public." John C. Reitz, Section VT Computers
andLaw: E-Government, 54 Am. J. CowE. L. 733, 744 (2006). FirstGov.gov, a "searchable entry
point for filing comments in any federal rulemaking proceeding" was introduced by the Clinton
Administration in 2000. John C. Reitz, Section VI. Computers and Law: E-Government, 54 AM.
J. CoMw. L. 733, 744 (2006). Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall ofRegulation and the Rise of
Governance in ContemporaryLegal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 360 (2004). Essentially, the
E-Government Act codified FirstGov.gov, and in addition, created a new office within the Office
of Management and Budget devoted to these concerns. James W. Conrad Jr., The Information
Quality Act-Antiregulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions?, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 521, 527
(2003). See also E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, 2902-03. This
office, the Office of Electronic Government and Technology, is headed by a Chief Information
Officer. Its mission is "to shift perspective, move to citizen-centered services and create a real
electronic government." See Office of Electronic Government and Technology, available at http://
www.estrategy.gov/flashmain.cfm?action-main (follow "About Us" hyperlink)(last visited July
12, 2006)(quoting Deputy Associate Administrator, Mary Mitchell).
" Establishment of a New System ofRecords Noticefor the FederalDocket ManagementSystem, 70
FED. REG. 15,086 (Mar. 24, 2005).
65
1 See GEORGE PAPENDREOU, E-DEMOCRACY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION, IPTS REPORT (June 2003); see
Share I/S at n.54. The effort at e-democracy is not limited to the U.S. Spurred by Greece, the EU
has promoted an e-democracy initiative in 1994.
"6James S. Fishkin, Deliberative Polling: From Experiment to Community Resource, in THE
DELIBERATIVE DEMOcRAcY HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CMc ENGAGEMENT IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTuRY, 68 (2005); See also James S. Fishkin, The TelevisedDeliberativePoll:An Experiment
in Democracy, 546 ANNALS 132, 134-37, 140 (1996); James S. Fishkin, The Casefor a National
Caucus: Taking Democracy Seriously, AUANTIc 16-18 Aug. 1988; James S. Fishkin, Framework
ofAnalysis andProposalsfor Reform: A Symposium on Campaign Finance: ConflictingIdeals of
Democracy: Reflections on Reform of the Democratic Process, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 395, 405-10
(1989)(describing the "National Caucus" concept); Bruce E. Cain, The Internetin the (Dis)Service
of Democracy?, 34 Loy. L. REv. 1005, 1016 (2001).
63
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stakeholders and members of the general public)."' 67 "The more public participation
in the promulgation of an agency rule, the more deference that rule should receive
when it is challenged in court."' 68 However, scholars differ as to the potential success
online systems enabling enhanced participation will achieve. While Orly Lobel has
noted the potential of e-rulemaking to enhance legislative transparency by spawning
"deliberative forums... (and) panels of citizens, like traditional juries, that would
advise about rulemaking,"' 69 not all commentators agree. For example, Beth Noveck
argues that this heightened transparency will simply "increase the incentive for
agencies and the public to 'work around' technological mechanisms and shift away
from transparent toward less democratic, but more manageable models of back-room
consultation.""'7 Quoting from Dan Esty, Noveck further points out that "giving
'voice' to more people does not guarantee better policymaking."' 71
For a time, legislatures stepped up to the plate, requiring (as in the Magnuson-Moss
WarrantyAct) 7 agencies to pay the expenses of citizens to participate in hearings under
the Act. 73 However, in recent years, the legislature's enthusiasm for maximum public
participation has somewhat waned. We have seen, in Sidney Shapiro's words, efforts
to "limit participation of interest groups representing regulatory beneficiaries.' 1' 74
That comes, I suggest, from a recognition that participation and especially maximal
possible participation cannot solve the democratic deficit in administrative law. 75

67

1 David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative ProcedureAct: Democracy Index Rulemaking, 74

FoRD.HAm L. Rav. 81, 82 (2005).
Id.
' Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The FallofRegulation andthe Rise of Governancein Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN.L. RaV. 342, 360-61 (2004).
17'Beth Noveck, The ElectronicRevolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433,
443 (2004).
68

1

69

Id.

171

Pub. L. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975), also known as the "Lemon Law."
73
1 1d. at Sec. 202 (a), Sec. 18 (h)(1), 88 Stat. 2197-98.
'74Sidney Shapiro, PragmaticAdministrativeLaw, IssuEs INLEGAL SCHOLARtSHI: THE
REFORMATION OF
AMRICAN AOMINISTRATIVE LAW (2005), availableat http://0-www.bepress.com.columbo.law.cua.
172

edu:80/ils/ iss6/artl (last visited March 5, 2007).

175
We must recognize some caveats to this paen to participatory values. As Kenneth Ward notes,

..weaker interests today (many small businesses, consumer groups) have very little
chance of
influencing, say, rulemaking in their favor over the wishes of the powerful interests (for example,
IBM, General Motors, ITT, AMA), because virtually all the wild cards in the game have already
been dealt to the big interest." KENNETH F. WARD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 233
(2004). Further compounding the problem, "big interests are not only too much for the competitors
but too much for the regulatory agencies as well." Id.at 233.
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Indeed, one Italian scholar has underscored that "participation is more associated with
good administration than democracy."'

76

Academics may love the use of interest group representation in administrative
decision making. Indeed, one of my Conference colleagues on this panel has proposed
177
such a participatory (or interest based) approach to Israeli administrative law.
However, the interest representation approach can easily turn administrative agencies
into venues for interest group pluralism. This is only a polite term for lobbying by
special interests, thus introducing the problems of the legislative process into the
executive branch.'78
For good or ill the pressure for participatory democracy that underlay the French
street demonstrations of May 1968 and the American student movement of the 1970s
has lost some but not all of its allure. And while the participatory project is no
longer seen as conclusive proof of legitimacy in administrative law, it is important
nonetheless. 179 That it has reached its apogee, however, reflects the problem of
squaring the democratic impulse with the logic of the administrative state.

E. The Problem of Deference

How does the practice of deference fit into my argument that the American political
system distrusts bureaucracy? By deference, of course, I mean the rigor by which
176 Fabrizio Fracchia, Administrative ProceduresandDemocracy: The Italian Experience, 12 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 589. 592 (2005). Fracchia states, "[s]ome scholars suggest that procedural
participation can compensate for this democratic defeat. I do not agree with this view." Id. at
594.
"'Daphne Barak-Erez, The Administrative Processas a Domain ofConflictingInterests, 6 THEoREICAL
INQ. L. 193 (2005); "the decision-making process of the administrative agency in actuality entails a

fundamental balancing of conflicting interests, similar to that "intended by the legislature." Id. at
196.
178Indeed,

we should remember that according to Richard Stewart, "there is no feasible means to
ensure that all stakeholders with significant interest are represented in the administrative process
.... " The potential gaps in representation are "exacerbated by 'agency costs' which are only
heightened by greater participation. In the end, these higher costs "would increase the difficulty

of equalizing the influence of diffuse interest groups who were now allowed to participate in
agency proceedings because of the inherent advantages of focused interest groups in organizing
and raising the money necessary for such participation." See Mark Seidenfeld, The Quixotic Quest
for a Unified Theory of the Administrative State, 6 IssuEs INLEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 2 (2005) available
179

at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art2/ (last visited November 25, 2006).
SSEPHIEN BREvER, AcTrvE LIBERTY 15-16 (2005)(promoting the concept of "active liberty" defined
as "a sharing of a nation's sovereign authority among its people" through political participation.).
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courts review agency decisions (that is to say, decisions made by the bureaucracy).
At first glance, theories of heightened deference appear to frustrate efforts to confront
the "democratic deficit." However, I would argue to the contrary, that theories of
heightened deference in fact contribute to resolving the challenge of the democratic
deficit.
In the early years of the "administrative state," critics did not trust administrative
agencies to follow "the rule of the law" and sought independent de novo review of
agency determinations.180 Over time, this distrust of the agency adjudication process
8
ameliorated and we saw high levels ofjudicial deference to agency expertise. ' This
was the way of New Deal jurisprudence," 2 which began to be cut back, albeit mildly,
with the passage of the APA. 183 In that Act, Congress, in Justice Frankfurter's words,
set a 'mood' of somewhat increased review,184 which was itself ratcheted up with the
5
development of the "hard look" doctrine by the judges of the DC Circuit."

"'°See Cincinnati, N. 0. & T.P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com., 162 U.S. 184, 196 (1896)("the
findings of the Commission shall be regarded as prima facie evidence"); see also Kentucky &
I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 37 F. 567, 612-614 (C.C.D. Ky. 1889)(where the court
indicated that facts investigated and reported by the interstate commerce commission were only
prima facie evidence in subsequent judicial proceedings, which are considered "original and
independent proceeding[s]" that "determine[] the cause de novo").
The high water mark for such deference when it came to rulemaking was Pacific States Box &
Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935)(quoting Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin,
293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934))("[I]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain

[the order], there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts, and one who assails [that
presumption] must carry the burden of showing... that the action is arbitrary.").
1S2See Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms and Refinements,

68 MNrN. L. REv. 299, 306, 1983 (discussing regulatory mechanisms of the new deal era and
the deference given to agency administrators); Robert L. Rabin, Legitimacy, Discretion, and
the Concept of Rights, 92 YALE L.J. 1174, 1178-80 (1983)(discussing the new deal era and
rise of administrative expertise). See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
(1938)(explaining the rise of faith in administrative expertise during the New Deal era).
183Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1966). For a history of the APA, see Walter
Gellhom, The AdministrativeProcedureAct: The Beginnings,72 VA. L. REv. 219 (1986)(describing

the actions that led to the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act).
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,477 (1951). See generally, Alfred S.Neely, Justice

184

Frankfurter Universal Camera andA JurisprudenceofJudicialReview ofAdministrative Action,

25 U. TOL. L. REv. 1 (1994)(reviewing Universal Camera and criticizing Justice Frankfurter's
opinion on judicial review of administrative finding of fact).
185Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,415 (1971), is credited with refining
the hard look doctrine, created by Judge Leventhal in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971), by requiring "probing, in-depth
review" of agency action. See also Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Pikes Peak Broad. Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1969)); Colloquy, The Fifth
Annual Robert C. Byrd Conference on the AdministrativeProcess: The First Year ofClinton/Gore:
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After enacting the APA, Congress once again entered the fray with proposals
(that never became law) to increase judicial review of regulatory agency activity.
Between 1975-80, Congress tried numerous times to amend the APA to require that
courts decide all relevant questions of law de novo, ignoring agency interpretations.
Those bills were styled Bumper Amendments after Senator Dale Bumpers of
Arkansas.186 In the 1990s, various iterations of the conservative regulatory reform
efforts, culminating in the Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995 (S.
343)(introduced by Senator Bob Dole but never passed by the Senate),187 sought to
codify "a relatively stringent version of the Chevron doctrine."' 88 Essentially, the
first permutation of the bill sought to create "a sort of neo-Bumpers Amendment
. . . [attempting] to make a more searching and potent weapon against agency

overreaching" 88 in order to impose "new curbs on agency discretion."'' 9 The bill
offered extensive, some say innumerable, opportunities for judicial review as a way
of checking agency action. For example, it provided for review of the substance as
well as the form of agency cost-benefit analyses and agency decisions to characterize
rules as "major" or not.'9 '

Reinventing Government or Refining Reagan/Bush Initiatives?,8 ADmIN. L.J. AM. U. 23,41(1994).
See also Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 73 TEXAs L. REv. 83, 128-29 (1994)("[T]he 'hard

look' test ... asks the courts to steep themselves in agency policy and the substantive debate
framing the issue under consideration to ensure that the agency below gave a 'hard look' to all
factors relevant to its decision.").
86
' See the text as of the end of 1980, 126 Cong. Rec. S13, 877 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) and as
passed by the Senate in an earlier form, 125 Cong. Rec. S12, 145 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979). For
a discussion of the Bumpers Amendment, see James T. O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference:
A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers JudicialReview Amendment, 49 U. CiN. L. REv.739 (1980);
Ronald M. Levin, Review of "Jurisdictional"Issues Under the Bumpers Amendment, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 285, 358 (1983); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the
AdministrativeState, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 473-74 (1989).
87
S.343, 104a Cong. (1995). The history of the Dole bill is succinctly described in Cass Sunstein,
Legislative Foreword: Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and the Cost- Benefit State, 48 STAN.L.
REv. 247, 277-282 (1994).
'8 Ronald M. Levin, Scope ofReview Legislation: The Lessons of1995, 31 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 647,
655-56 (1996)(citing Regulatory Revisions: Hearingson S.343 Before the Subcomm. On Admin.
Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)(statement
of George C. Freeman, Jr., & Philip J. Harter, Cochairs, American Bar Association's Working

Group on Regulatory Reform)("This section essentially codifies the 'hard look' line of Chevron
cases.")).
189Id.
191
Id.at 657.
''ld. (proposing 5 U.S.C. §§ 622-25). These legislative proposals also promote accountability of a
different sort by requiring an agency to undertake a review of the rules' efficacy within ten years
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While the Congress undertook to limit deference through a series of failed
legislative initiatives, the Court in 1984, in Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources
Defense Council, moved from "substitution of judgment" or "weak deference" in
192
judicial review of legal question to a more permissive or deferential stance. Chevron
stated that:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.193

Chevron soon became the "default" position for judicial review of administrative
agency action. It "signified a fundamental paradigm-shift that redefined the rules of
courts and agencies when construing statutes over which agencies have been given
interpretive rights."' 194 The gravamen of Chevron was to give "more policy discretion
and law-making authority to administrative agencies, most of which are part of the

after promulgation, id. at § 3 (a), and by enacting "look-back" provisions, by which a member
of the regulated community can ask or require an agency to review the efficacy of a particular
rule at any time, perhaps even when the rule is about to be enforced on that party. See id. at § 4
(a)(including a "look-back" provision as part of the proposed comprehensive Regulatory Reform
Act). This ensures that the agency decision does not stray too far from contemporary congressional
will. Further, the Dole bill not only allowed for more extensive judicial review of agency actions,
it would also have required that proposed agency regulation be brought back to Congress and "laid
on the table," where Congress would have the opportunity to enact a "two-house" veto, clearly
constitutional even under Chadha.Id. (proposing U.S.C. § 801). See INS v. Chadha, 454 U.S. 812
(1981).
192Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
93

Id. at 842-43.

94
1 E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress,

Courts, and Agencies in EnvironmentalLaw, 16 VILL.

ENvTL.

L. J. 1 (2005).
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As such, Chevron has been called the "counter-Marburyof the

1'96

On the surface, this move to heightened deference reflects a recognition of the need
for agency discretion due to agency expertise; there is much language in Chevron to
justify that approach. 197 Nonetheless, I would argue that the justifications put forward
in Chevron for 'privileging' agency determinations reflect as much a populist as a
technocratic bias. 198 This populist rationale behind Chevron "anchored" the approach
of Chevron "in the theory of majoritarianism,"' "invoking democratic theory as
a basis of requiring deference to executive interpretations." 2" Under this populist
rationale, the executive is the most democratically legitimate branch (as the president
is elected by the entire nation).2"' Indeed, as Justice Breyer (dissenting) wrote in
Brown & Williamson, "Presidents, just like Members of Congress, are elected by the
public. Indeed, the President and Vice President are the only public officers whom
the entire nation elects."2 2 Since the administrative agencies are accountable to a

195 Id. at 5.

Sunstein, Law andAdministrationAfter Chevron, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 2071, 2075 (1990).
The reference, of course, is to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
'9 See Chevron, supra note 192, at 865 ("Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the Administrator
to strike the balance [between conflicting policies] at this level, thinking that those with great
expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better
position to do so....").
'9'See id. at 865-66 (1984)("Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch.... While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is,
and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices....").
199Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The ChangingStructure ofLegitimacy in StatutoryInterpretation,
108 HARv.L. Rav. 593, 614 (1995).
200Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 978 (1992)
("This new emphasis on democratic theory was important to the doctrinal framework because it
supplied the justification for switching the default rule from independent judgment to deference.").
We must remember that while Chevron deference "is not a rule of constitutional law per se, ...
it is nevertheless presumes an important separation of powers principle." LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERicA CoNsT~rtrIoNAL LAw 994 (3d ed. 2000). As Judge Silberman has point out "That is
not to say that Chevron is in any sense constitutionally dictated by the separation of powers." As
Justice Scalia has observed, for any given statute, Congress could rebut Chevron "spresumptionthat ambiguous statutes should be interpreted by the agency rather than the judiciary-by stripping
the agency of deference. Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron- Intersection of Law & Policy, 58
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821, 824 (1990).
201This is not completely accurate because of the Electoral College, see U.S. CONST. AMaND. XII. For
evidence of this, see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
202FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 190 (2000)(Breyer, J., dissenting).
'96See Cass
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3
president who is popularly elected," their judgments should receive deference from
24
Thus,
the judiciary who are politically unaccountable by constitutional design.
lifeto
the
standing
political
superior
ones-have
independent
"[t]he agencies-even
2 °5
tenured federal judiciary in performing that policy making function."

Indeed, as Justice Stevens writes in Chevron:

[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly
rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to
the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for
this political branch of Government to make such policy choicesresolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by
the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of
everyday realities.2" 6

Even in cases like Brown & Williamson,2 °7 where the Court did not defer to the
agency, the Court's explanation was phrased in terms of democratic legitimacyJ. Pierce, Democratizing the Administrative State (October 2005). GWIU Law School
Public Law Research Paper No. 173. Abstract available at: http://ssm.com/abstract-839227 (last
visited March 25, 2007).
2
04See U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 1, cl.
2 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
205
Silberman, supranote 200, at 823. See also Mark Seidenfeld, ASyncopated Chevron: Emphasizing
Reasoned Decisionmakingin Reviewing Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REv. 83,
97 (1994)("Chevron implicitly justifies this transfer of responsibility largely on the theory that
agencies are more politically accountable than courts.").
206Chevron, supra note 192 at 865-66. Indeed, as one commentator has suggested, "[a]ccording to
Chevron,... it is always better to have an accountable actor make policy than a non-accountable one.
A court, as grand enforcer of democratic norms, must surrender and reassign its own interpretive
authority to a body perceived to have a better democratic pedigree." Schacter, supra note 199,
at 617. In contrast, Marc Seidenfeld argues that Chevron resolves the accountability problem by
implementing a form of interest group pluralism. Seidenfeld "views the democratic process as a
competition between various interest groups for government- provided benefits." Seidenfeld, supra
note 178, at 97. Indeed, "according to the pluralistic democracy model, agencies should make
political choices that satisfy the demands of the interest groups that make up the constituency of
the directly accountable branches of government- Congress and the President. This is the precise
role that the Chevron court sees agencies playing." Id. at 99-100. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991) stands for that proposition.
207529 U.S. at 161.
23 Richard
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specifically that some questions are too extraordinary to presume that Congress had
delegated authority to the agency to make the policy call. This approach has been
denominated the 'major question' exception to Chevron deference." 8 And indeed,
in such cases (where deference is rejected), it has been argued that the Court was
responding to a perception that the administration was acting in ways that while
technically legal were viewed (by some) as undemocratic.2" 9 Or, as Bressman puts it,
a condition of deference is "that an agency not only possess delegated authority but
exercises such authority in a democratically reasonable fashion."2 l
By locating authority in the president-the one official who speaks for all the
people-the Chevron approach to statutory interpretation deftly avoids the legitimacy
21
problem traditionally faced by administrative law. '
208The

"major question" exception is discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L.
REv. 187, 193 (2006), where he asserts that through a "trilogy" of outlier cases (FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33, 159-61 (2000); Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703-08 (1995); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T
Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228-34 (1994)), the Court suggests the "possibility that deference will be
reduced, or even nonexistent, if a fundamental issue is involved, one that goes to the heart of the
regulatory scheme at issue. The apparent theory is that Congress should not be taken to have asked
agencies to resolve those issues." For an alternative theory, see Lisa S. Bressman, Deference
and Democracy, GEo. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007)(citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct.
904 (2006))[hereinafter Bressman, Deference], arguing that the real issue the Court confronted
revolved around the agency's "undemocratic" use of its authority, rather than whether Congress
had delegated the authority in the first place.
209
Bressman, Deference, id
21
0Id.

There is, of course, another source of democratic legitimacy-the Congress. And one may wonder
why one might not look to Congress as a way of avoiding the democratic deficit problem. Most
scholars who support Chevron argue that democratic accountability is more likely to be found
in the president than the Congress. The president is seen as having a national constituency and
thus is more responsive than Congressmen to the electorate as a whole. See JERRY L. MsHAW,
GREED, CHAos, AND GovERNANCE 152 (1997)(asserting that President is more responsive to public
preferences because he deals with national issues and has no specific constituency negotiating
benefits for votes). Supporters of presidential accountability tend to denigrate the congressional
branch as a source of democratic accountability. Tracking recent application of "public choice
theory" they argue "that the legislature will produce too few laws that serve truly public ends,
and too many laws that serve private ends." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Symposium on the Theory
of Public Choice: Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 277 (1988). Public choice theory, they would argue, "posits
that legislatures fall prey to endless cycling and agenda manipulation in any voting scheme [and]
suggests that, even under ideal circumstances and given the best intentions, Congress may be
unable to arrive at constitutional decisions that are wholly consistent with the preferences of a
majority of Congress' members. Note, Should the Supreme Court Presume that Congress Acts
Constitutionally? The Role of the Canon ofAvoidance and Reliance on Early Legislative Practice
in ConstitutionalInterpretation,116 HARv. L. Rv. 1798, 1800 (2003). A less theoretical critique
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This effort to employ democratic legitimacy as the justification of Chevron has
operational consequences. For example, on that model, Chevron "explicitly recognized
an incumbent administration's policies as a legitimate factor that might influence an
212
'
agency to alter its interpretation of... a statutory term." This would explain Professor
213
Richard Pierce's critique of two recent post-Chevron cases; Christensen v. Harris
County,114 where the Court rejected the argument that it should, per Chevron, defer2to16
215
and Bates v. Dow Agrosciences,
interpretations first put forward in legal briefs,
where the court declined to adopt a 2003 Bush administration interpretation of the
217
extent to which the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
preempts state lawsuits concerning the "duty to warn." The Bush interpretation had
rejected an earlier 2000 Clinton administration interpretation of FIFRA allowing such
suits. 218 Pierce is concemed that given the long time frame involved in effectuating
statutory change, as well as in promulgating substantive regulations, "a newly-elected
President with policy preferences that differ from those of his predecessor is unlikely
to get most of his preferred policies approved by courts and in effect in his first term
in office.1 2 19 He believes that positions put forward by a prior administration should
not remain privileged during the first term of a newly-elected president. 221 Similarly
of congress as an institution reflective of the public interest can be found in THOMAS E.
NoRMAN J. ORNsTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH:

How

MANN

&

CONoRSS ISFAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT

ON TRACK 212 (2006). The authors condemn the "'gradual collapse of the center in Congress,"
asserting that parties now search for political success through "corrosive partisanship" leading to a
decline in politicians "'who care about compromise, product, and institutional health."
212Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 100. See also Motor Vehicle Mfr's Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983),
BACK

The agency's changed view ...seems to be related to the election of a new President of a
different political party... A change in administration brought about by the people casting
their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs
and benefits of its programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the
bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate
priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.
(Justice Rehnquist concurring and dissenting, 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983).
213Pierce, Richard J., Democratizingthe AdministrativeState, GWU Law School Public Law Research
Paper No. 173, 4, 10-17. (October 2005), abstract available at http://ssm.com/abstract-839227
(last visited November 7, 2006).
214Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
215

d. at 586.

216Bates

v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005). The case is discussed in Joseph Frueli,

Pesticides,Preemption, and the Return of Tort Protection, 23
2177 U.S.C. 136 etseq (2000).
2ISBates, 544 U.S. at 448.
219

Id.
°Id.at 15.

22
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REG. 299 (2006).
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Justice Scalia has argued that Chevron deference should be applied as long as the
expression of an agency's interpretation is authoritative, regardless if that opinion has
not been through the formal "notice and comment" process. 221 In Pierce's opinion,
"Scalia's broader approach to Chevron would allow a President to get most of his
preferred policies approved and in effect within a couple ofyears of taking office. 22 2 In
contrast to Scalia's majoritarian approach, Justice Souter views deference in Chevron
as a function of agency expertise, reserved for situations where an agency's opinion is
expressed more "formally," i.e., after formal "notice and comment" procedure.3
Furthermore, tracking the implications of this approach Elena Kagan has proposed
to "link deference in some way to presidential involvement" 224 ratcheting up the level
of deference according to the level of executive involvement. Following this logic,
some have argued that Chevron requires a less deferential standard for independent
226
'
agencies 225 which by constitutional tradition remain "free from executive control.
Of course, the view that there should be little or no "drag" on the implementation
of policy preferences put forth by a new administration conflicts directly with notions
of rationality and expertise as lodestars for administrative behavior. While Chevron
speaks to canons of statutory interpretation, not standards of judicial review, the
majoritarian approach to Chevron regarding deference conflicts directly with the spirit
of the so-called "hard look" doctrine of judicial review, 21 7 as reflected inthe State
Farm221 case-a spirit that placed burdens of rationality and reasoned explanation on
new administrations seeking to change regulatory policy.
It is in this light that one must consider the comments of critics of the "democratic"
explication of Chevron, such as Thomas Merrill, who has argued that the decision
reflects "a doctrine for Jacobeans: [that] the results of a single Presidential election
are a sufficient cause for wholesale modifications in the law, with no offsetting
221Christensen, 529

U.S. at 591 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

12Pierce, supra note 213, at 17.
223

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,228 (2001)(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.

224

134, 139-40 (U.S. 1944)).

Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L. Rav. 2245, 2376, 2378 (2001). In that
regard she would distinguish "between actions taken by executive branch agencies and those taken
by independent commissions." Id. at 2376.

225Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58
22

ADmrN. L. REv.429, 432 (2006).

Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
"See supra note 178, and accompanying text.
228Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass 'n, 463 U.S. 29.
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229
'
They have sought other
incentive for stability or protection of reliance interests."
explanations. One justification focused on the need to promote regulatory uniformity
through a kind of interpretative Occam's Razor which allocated interpretative
responsibility to the agency thus "enhanc[ing] the probability of uniform rational
administration of the laws" rather than relaying on the diverse interpretations of
156 federal appellate judges and 12 circuit courts. 3° A second justification sought
to resurrect the New Deal notion of experts, drawing on language in Chevron itself
which states "that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for
administering the provision would be in a better position [than Congress] to do
SO.231

Today, however, we see a seeming retrenchment of Chevron or, at least, a
"domestication" of the text's political reach.2 32 This can be best seen in United States
v. Mead 233 where the Court refocused the Chevron grundnorm on the requirement of
congressional intent, generally ignoring the larger theoretical rationales reflected by
and in the accountability "project" of administrative law. Thomas Merrill presaged
this development as early as 1992, when he noted that "the failure of Chevron to
perform as expected can be attributed to the Court's reluctance to embrace the
draconian implications of the [Chevron] doctrine for the balance of power among the
branches, and to practical problems generated by its all-or-nothing approach to the
234
deference question.
On this view, we cannot presume that "accountability" empowers the executive
branch to make interpretive judgments unless the legislative (with its own claims
to democratic legitimacy) so approves. Therefore, "accountability" alone cannot
fully resolve the challenge of the relationship between courts and agencies in the
administrative state.

229

Merrill, supra note 200, at 1028.

230Peter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's

Limited Resources for JudicialReview ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1987).

231Chevron, supranote 192 at 865.
232Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Cmi.-KErN. L. REV. 1253

(1997).
233535

U.S. 218 (2001); see also Lisa Bressman, How Mead has Muddled JudicialReview ofAgency

Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443 (2005)[hereinafter Bressman, Mead](providing a "narrow" reading
of Mead).
supra note 200, at 970.

234Merrill,
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I should note here a powerful alternate reading of Chevron based on a view
of administrative law different from my own. In a series of recent articles, 25 Lisa
Bressman argues that "the relationship between deference and democracy is more
complicated than we have thought. ' 236 Indeed, she mounts a frontal assault on the
view that legitimacy in administrative law derives from a successful effort to overcome
administrative law's 'democratic deficit.' Instead, she argues that it is "erroneous"
to believe that "the constitutional structure is committed foremost to promoting
political accountability. '21 Rather, she argues that "political accountability alone
238
'
does not adequately discipline the exercise of governmental lawmaking authority.
True legitimacy, she believes, comes from control of arbitrary government conduct
though rule of law practices. 239 In her view, "'procedural formality also is necessary
to guard against, among other things, even the 'authoritative' production of unfair,
inconsistent, or arbitrary law. '24° Such "[p]rocedural formality, whether imposed
under constitutional law or administrative law, always has been a necessary feature of
24 1
governmental legitimacy.
This approach results in a different reading of Chevron and its progeny. Bressman
would not justify Chevron s allocation of decisional power to agencies on the grounds
that the executive branch (e.g. the president) represents electoral accountability.
Rather, she would argue that Chevron deference is justified as a way for the judiciary
2 42
to monitor against arbitrary behavior by agencies.
Bressman's rejection of democracy as the source of political legitimacy reflects
skepticism about the importance of popular will in our constitutional system. Like her
colleague Edmund Rubin, she would reject "the assumption that elections promote
2

11

See Bressman, Deference, supra note 208; Bressman, Mead, supra note 233; Bressman, Judicial

Review, supra note 67; Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 50; and Lisa Schultz
Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the
PracticeofPresidentialControl, Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 06-07, MICH. L. REV.
Vol. 105 (2006).
236Bressman, Deference, supra note 208, at 1.
23' Bressman, JudicialReview, supra note 67, at 1658-59.
238Bressman, Mead, supra note 233, at 1449.
239 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 50, at 532 (charging that Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass 'ns "'signaled a rule of law deficit that could only be made up with administrative
standards."). See also Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti Administrative
Impulses, 103 MICH. L. REy. 2073, 2077 (2004-5).
240Bressman, Mead, supra note 233, at 1449.
241 Id.
242

Id. at 1450.
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accountability," arguing instead that a "relationship to accountability, although not
243
Her somewhat
entirely absent, is a relatively minor aspect of the electoral process."
elitist approach suggests that mere democracy is not enough; one must have deliberative
and rationaldemocracy as well.
2
While I am all for deliberative democracy, " as it creates a better
democracy, political legitimacy comes from the people-drunk or sober. Political
legitimacy is key. Why? Because it provides a surrogate for democratic legitimacy.

I disagree.

What Bressman ignores is that you can have better and worse democracies, democracies
with strong traditions of the rule of law (and accountability), and those with higher
levels of political cronyism.
Furthermore, there is no need to be forced by Bressman into the fateful choice
between democratic values, which by their nature demand political accountability,
and rule of law values as the touchstone of legitimacy. Rather, I would suggest that
the pressure for accountability in administrative law reflects an effort to substitute
for the lack of democratic legitimacy. 45 It is a functional surrogate that stands in
for democratic legitimacy. Therefore, as I have argued earlier,246 the accountability
project is yet another effort to substitute for administrative law's democratic "deficit,"
not a rejection of the "deficit" problem.
Bressman's approach, then, need not be inconsistent with the analysis in this
paper. Indeed, there is a sense in which Bressman herself is not fully opposed to
this view. Her "domesticated" understanding of Chevron would limit deference in
situations where the executive branch acts in ways that do not reflect full and open
democratic debate. Despite her best efforts, Bressman's focus remains on democratic
legitimacy-she diverges only in that she seeks to achieve this end by concentrating
solely on the rationality project, while dismissing the advantages of accountability,
transparency, and participation. I would submit that it is perilous to ignore the benefits
to be reaped from each of these approaches, as no one approach has demonstrated an
ability to bring administrative law fully in step with the nation's traditional democratic
principles (a fundamental part of our national identity).

243See

Rubin, supra note 239, at 2077.

244See Fishkin, supra note 166.
245
246

See supra text accompanying notes 52-89.
See the U.S. Constitution, Article I.
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IV. Conclusion

Where does all this leave us? The four projects discussed above all reflect the
challenge of securing legitimacy for the American administrative process. All are
efforts to provide some kind of substitute for the perceived democratic deficit in
American administrative law. All can only provide partial recompense. Their almost
dialectical process of rise and fall suggests that the "quest for a 'unified' theory
of the administrative state," is illusory at best.247 It is no surprise that, in Richard
Stewart's words, "Administrative law will continue to be evolutionary and strongly
conserving in character. The several existing forms and remedies will continue to be
maintained, although their application may change, even as new ones are developed
'
and added."248
However nostalgic one might be for a more modest government sector, in the
end, we must live with the modem administrative state. As Justice Breyer has noted,
"to achieve our democratically chosen ends in a modem populous society requires
some amount of administration, involving administrative, not democratic, decisionmaking. To achieve those same ends in a technologically advanced society requires
'
expertise."249
However, the 21" century will no doubt raise all sorts of new issues and
innovations for administrative lawyers to consider, including issues as diverse as the
role of government corporations; the role of public-private partnerships; the extension
of government rules of process to private sector activities that have a large state
regulatory context; the movement from command-and-control rules to performance
rules; new efforts to bring arbitration and mediation into the administrative process;
the proper treatment of informal adjudication; and new approaches to reinvigorating
the arguably "ossified" rulemaking process.

247

Seidenfeld, supra note 178. Reuel Schiller argues that the "incoherence that has developed in

administrative law" derives not from the legitimacy challenge but from "the decline of legal
liberalism and the political ascendancy of a Republican party" reflecting "a laissez-faire. Antistatist ideology." Reuel E. Schiller, Enlargingthe Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and
the ChangingDefinition ofPluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1389, 1451-52 (2000).
248Richard B. Stewart, Essay: Administrative Law in the Twenty First Century, 78 N.Y.U.L. REv.
437, 453 (2003).
249HON. STEPHEN BREYER, AcTIVE LIBERTY 102-03 (2005).
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The central problem never changes. Whatever these innovations propose to do
in terms of efficiency or equity they will need to address the problem of legitimacy.
Countries like France and perhaps Israel, can appeal to the "technocratic" model.
However, for Americans, the appeal to experts will not suffice and for that reason
efforts to ensure the legitimacy of the American administrative state will continue to
develop and evolve.

